



THE RIGHT TO PETITION AS ACCESS AND 
INFORMATION 
MICHAEL WEINGARTNER† 
Our lobbying industry is widely criticized as a pay-for-play system that prioritizes 
powerful interests at the expense of the common good. Legislative e!orts at lobbying 
reform, however, raise fundamental questions under the First Amendment, 
particularly where lobbying regulations operate to restrict lobbying activity directly. 
Recent scholarship into the First Amendment Petition Clause, however, o!ers new 
insights into what the First Amendment means for lobbying and public engagement 
with lawmakers more generally. As the history of petitioning in England, the 
American colonies, and Congress illustrates, the right to petition protected more than 
simply a form of political speech but rather a quasi-procedural right to equal 
participation in the lawmaking process. 
This Comment adds to this growing literature by considering the history of 
petitioning from an institutional perspective and how the Petition Clause may serve 
as a guide for structing the lawmaking process. The history of petitioning reveals two 
important interests that are central to petitioning’s historical function: the allocation 
of government access between competing interests and the provision of information to 
lawmakers. This Comment traces these interests and describes how they drove the 
development of formal petitioning and how they have consistently informed the 
Supreme Court’s Petition Clause jurisprudence. Moving forward, a renewed focus on 
access and information can help inform institutional e!orts to reform our lobbying 
system, as well as doctrinal developments that recognize the government’s interest in 
building a more open, equitable, and informed system of engagement with the public. 
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“[I]t is essential to liberty that the government in general, should have a 
common interest with the people; so it is particularly essential that . . . 
[Congress] . . . should have an immediate dependence on, [and] an intimate 
sympathy with the people.” 
—James Madison1  
 
“We had a hierarchy in my o!ce, in Congress. If you were a lobbyist who 
never gave us money, I didn’t talk to you. If you were a lobbyist who gave us 
money, I might talk to you.”  
—Mick Mulvaney, Former U.S. Representative.2 
 
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. $" (James Madison). 
2 Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Remarks at the American Bankers 
Association Annual Conference !! (Apr. "(, "'!)), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/(((%%""-Transcript-Mulvaney-ABA-Conference-(-
"(-"'!).html [https://perma.cc/G%*X-&LD&]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In politics, access is everything. Who gets access to lawmakers and who 
doesn’t drives the legislative agenda, de+nes the parameters of the debate, 
and decides policy outcomes.3 Over the last several decades, a widespread 
informal lobbying industry has emerged as a means of buying and selling 
access to lawmakers. This system has been criticized as a pay-for-play scheme 
that advances powerful interests at the expense of the public good,4 if not a 
perverse form of “legalized bribery,”5 and has contributed to historically low 
public faith in Congress.6 Attempts to regulate lobbying, however, raise 
fundamental questions under the First Amendment. 
The First Amendment’s Speech Clause prohibits laws “abridging the 
freedom of speech.”7 With this is mind, several commentators have assumed that 
 
3 A vast literature has emerged describing lobbying and in+uence in terms of access, including 
the role of access in legislative agenda-setting and in securing substantive outcomes. See, e.g., David 
Austen-Smith, Allocating Access for Information and Contributions, !( J.L. ECON. & ORG. "**, "** 
(!&&)) (describing the link between campaign contributions, access to lawmakers, and policy 
outcomes); Christopher Cotton, Pay-to-Play Politics: Informational Lobbying and Contribution Limits 
When Money Buys Access, &% J. PUB. ECON. #%&, #%& ("'!") (same); Frank R. Baumgartner, Je,rey 
M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball & Beth L. Leech, Money, Priorities, and Stalemate: How 
Lobbying A!ects Public Policy, !# ELECTION L.J. !&(, "'!-'$ ("'!() (discussing the impact of lobbying 
on the agenda-setting stage of the lawmaking process and noting how access may amplify or foreclose 
certain voices); Laura Langbein, Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence, () J. POL. !'$", !'$# 
(!&)%) (“Only access, or some other form of direct or indirect communication, can translate 
[campaign contributions] into in+uence.”); David C. Kimball, Frank R. Baumgartner, Je,rey M. 
Berry, Marie Hajnacki, Beth Leech & Bryce Summary, Who Cares About the Lobbying Agenda?, ! INT. 
GRPS. & ADVOC. $-"$ ("'!") (discussing the in+uence of lobbying access at the agenda-setting stage 
of the lawmaking process). See also infra Section I.A. 
4 See, e.g., Fighting Special Interest Lobbyist Power over Public Policy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Sept. "*, "'!*, &:'" AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/"'!*/'&/
"*/(#&%*$/-ghting-special-interest-lobbyist-power-public-policy [https://perma.cc/&HHT-*RDR] 
(“[L]opsided lobbying and campaign spending undermines the democratic process . . . by aligning 
the congressional agenda with the special interest lobbyists’ agenda . . . .”). 
5 See, e.g., Jimmy Williams, I Was a Lobbyist for More than " Years. I Quit. My Conscience Couldn’t 
Take it Anymore, VOX (Jan. $, "'!), *:(% AM), https://www.vox.com/first-person/"'!*/%/"&/!$))%&#%/
political-lobbying-lobbyist-big-money-politics [https://web.archive.org/web/"'"!'#!("##!!)/https://
www.vox.com/first-person/"'!*/%/"&/!$))%&#%/political-lobbying-lobbyist-big-money-politics] 
(describing the author’s own lobbying experience as “[y]ears of legalized bribery” that “exposed [him] 
to the worst elements of our country’s political workings”). 
6 See Justin McCarthy, U.S. Confidence in Organized Religion Remains Low, GALLUP (July ), "'!&), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/"$&&%(/confidence-organized-religion-remains-low.aspx [https://perma.cc/
TT#"-FXFS] (reporting that only !!% of those surveyed reported having “a great deal” or “quite a lot” 
of confidence in Congress, which has remained at the bottom of the list of surveyed institutions since 
"'!&); Little Public Support for Reductions in Federal Spending, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. !!, "'!&), 
https://www.people-press.org/"'!&/'(/!!/little-public-support-for-reductions-in-federal-spending 
[https://perma.cc/#C(K-$SZ$] (reporting that public trust in the federal government remains 
historically low, with just !*% of those surveyed reporting that they trust the federal government to do 
what is right “just about always” or “most of the time”). 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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when lobbyists meet with lawmakers, their activity constitutes a form of political 
speech protected by the First Amendment.8 The Supreme Court, however, has 
yet to hold that this is the case.9 Nevertheless, lower courts considering lobbying 
reform laws have tended to apply strict scrutiny, often fatally so, following the 
Court’s recent campaign finance decisions.10 But even if the speech of lobbyists 
is protected by the First Amendment, the issue is complicated by the fact that 
lobbying also involves the active participation of lawmakers who control access 
to themselves and make decisions about which political speech they will and will 
not listen to.11 The Speech Clause is silent as to how these decisions should be 
made or whether individuals or lobbyists have any right to lawmaker access. 
The First Amendment’s Petition Clause, on the other hand, protects “the 
right . . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”12 On its face, 
this Clause protects both a form of political speech—petitions—and a 
particular process for communicating with the government. The precise nature 
and function of the Petition Clause, however, remains unclear. Compared to 
other First Amendment rights, the right to petition has received relatively little 
attention from scholars,13 and the Supreme Court’s limited petition 
jurisprudence has largely conflated the right to petition with the right to 
speech, having gone so far as to describe the two as “cut from the same cloth.”14 
This view has contributed to claims that—like it or not—the First Amendment 
prohibits the government from regulating lobbying or access in any way.15 This 
 
8 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, %( Stan. L. Rev. !&!, 
!&% ("'!") (noting that “[s]peech aimed at in+uencing government action is core political speech” 
that implicates the First Amendment right to Free Speech); Alan B. Morrison, Introduction: 
Lobbyists—Saints or Sinners?, !& STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. !, ! ("'')) (“[T]he right to lobby is the right 
to petition the government for grievances, which is explicitly protected by the First Amendment.”). 
9 See Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, %) STAN. L. REV. !!#!, !!#$ ("'!%) 
(noting that, despite dicta hinting at constitutional limits on lobbying regulation, the Supreme 
Court has not addressed the issue squarely). 
10 See Hasen, supra note ), "!(–!% (discussing a series of recent cases in which the Supreme 
Court expressed skepticism about the “constitutionality of limits on the use of money to in+uence 
political outcomes,” including Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, $$) U.S. #!' ("'!')). 
11 See, e.g., JOHN MARK HANSEN, GAINING ACCESS: CONGRESS AND THE FARM LOBBY, !&!&-
!&)!, at ""-"$ (!&&!) (laying out a theory of access as lawmaker behavior); McKinley, supra note &, at 
!"'!-'" ("'!%) (noting that Congress has established a “de facto” process for allocating access to itself). 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
13 See, e.g., Anita Hodgkiss, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, &% YALE L.J. $%&, 
$%& n.! (!&)*) (noting the scarcity of commentary on the right to petition even within First 
Amendment scholarship); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a 
Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, "! HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. !$, !%, !% n." (!&&#) (same). 
14 McDonald v. Smith, (*" U.S. (*&, ()" (!&)$). 
15 See, e.g., Richard Bri,ault, The Anxiety of In#uence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, !# 
ELECTION L.J. !%', !%# ("'!() (“Lobbying is an aspect of the freedoms of speech, press, association, 
and petition protected by the [C]onstitution.”); Hasen, supra note ), at !&% (“Speech aimed at 
in+uencing government action is core political speech, and it would certainly be . . . 
unconstitutional . . . to bar individuals from lobbying to change government action.”); Morrison, 
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conflation, however, discounts the nearly eight-hundred-year history of the 
right to petition as it was exercised in England, in colonial governments, and 
in the United States Congress well into the twentieth century. In recent years, 
scholars have unearthed a wealth of historical evidence surrounding the right 
to petition.16 This history reveals that the right to petition protected not only 
the speech contained within a petition but also an individual right to equal and 
meaningful participation in the lawmaking process.17 
This Comment builds upon this recent scholarship by considering the 
history of petitioning from an institutional perspective. Historically, 
petitioning played a central role in structuring the lawmaking process and 
provided important bene+ts to both the governed and the government.18 This 
history not only helps to distinguish petitioning from ordinary political 
speech, but it also reveals two distinct institutional interests that provide 
independent rationales for legislative e,orts at lobbying reform. 
First, petitioning provided a mechanism for allocating access to 
lawmakers. Unlike our current lobbying system, in which access to lawmakers 
is allocated informally, petitioning made use of formal and institutionalized 
processes to bring matters to the attention of lawmakers.19 And while today 
access often goes disproportionately to the economically or politically 
powerful, the historical right to petition was far more egalitarian, extending 
to all people—even the unenfranchised—without regard for their wealth or 
political power.20 Any individual or group could, simply by drafting and +ling 
a formal petition, have their grievances heard and considered on equal 
 
supra note ), at ! (“[T]he right to lobby is the right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances, which is explicitly protected by the First Amendment.”). 
16 See generally Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition the Government 
for Redress of Grievances, &% YALE L.J. !(" (!&)%) (looking to records from the legislature of the 
Connecticut Colony and the early U.S. Congress to detail the controversy over the interpretation of 
the right to petition); Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the 
Right to Petition, %% FORDHAM L. REV. "!$# (!&&)) (examining documents from colonial legislature 
as well as the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the U.S. Constitution, 
state constitutions, and the Federalist Papers to interpret the right to petition); McKinley, supra note 
& (excavating colonial documents discussing the Magna Carta, papers from colonial legislatures, and 
other Revolutionary-era documents to interpret the right to petition); Eric Schnapper, “Libelous” 
Petitions for Redress of Grievances-Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, *( IOWA L. REV. #'# (!&)&) 
(arguing that the historical analysis contained in McDonald v. Smith is erroneous by examining the 
historical record that the Court did not include in its reasoning, including the English Bill of Rights 
and Revolutionary-era case law); Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . .”: An Analysis 
of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, $( U. CIN. L. REV. !!$# (!&)%) (mining historical 
sources from medieval England, the English Civil War, the Glorious Revolution, as well as American 
colonial and Revolutionary-era documents); Spanbauer, supra note !#. 
17 See infra Section II.A. 
18 See infra Part II. 
19 See infra Section II.A. 
20 See id. 
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footing.21 Petitioning thus allocated government access—a highly scarce and 
valuable public resource—by providing a quasi-procedural right to be heard.22 
Second, petitioning helped provide lawmakers with broad and inclusive 
information.23 Historically, formal petitioning served as the primary means 
of information gathering in England, the colonies, and the early United 
States.24 Petitions provided detailed information which lawmakers otherwise 
would have been unable to obtain, apprised lawmakers of the needs and 
desires of their constituents, and focused lawmaker attention on highly local 
or specialized issues they might otherwise have missed.25 Today, however, 
lawmakers are faced with a deluge of information that is largely mediated by 
lobbyists and thus disproportionately re-ects the interests of the politically 
powerful interests they represent.26 
This Comment seeks to bring these two interests—access and 
information—to the foreground and argues that the right to petition is best 
viewed not only as an individual right, but also as a guide for structuring the 
government’s engagement with the public. Part I begins by articulating what is 
at stake with respect to both access and information by identifying current 
challenges with each and discussing how our current lobbying system has 
proven insufficient. Next, Part II traces the history of the right to petition 
through the lenses of access and information. Part III then discusses how access 
and information have influenced the Supreme Court’s Petition Clause doctrine. 
Part IV discusses implications for institutional reform and how a renewed focus 
on the Petition Clause offers new doctrinal rationales for lobbying regulation. 
I. ACCESS AND INFORMATION 
In the Supreme Court’s most recent Petition Clause Case, Borough of 
Duryea v. Guarnieri, the Court recognized that the right to petition is distinct 
from the right to free speech and that “some e,ort must be made to identify 
 
21 See infra notes !$"–!$( and accompanying text. 
22 See infra Section II.A. 
23 See infra Section II.B. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See LORELEI KELLY, NEW AM. FOUND., CONGRESS’ WICKED PROBLEM: SEEKING 
KNOWLEDGE INSIDE THE INFORMATION TSUNAMI ( ("'!") (“[Congressional] o.ces are 
overwhelmed with the noise of incoming information, including from constituents, non-pro-t 
advocacy, fact-sheets, lobbying and commercially sponsored analysis.”). It is worth noting the body 
of commentary on the role of lobbyists in providing information to lawmakers. See, e.g., FRANK R. 
BAUMGARTNER, JEFFREY M. BERRY, MARIE HOJNACKI, DAVID C. KIMBALL & BETH L. LEECH, 
LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY $$ ("''&) (discussing 
how lobbyists help lawmakers sort through the bewildering complexity of major policy issues); 
Bertrall L. Ross II, Addressing Inequality in the Age of Citizens United, &# N.Y.U. L. REV. !!"', !!$' 
("'!)) (arguing that regulation of lobbying would reduce the information available to lawmakers). 
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the historic and fundamental principles that led to the enumeration of the 
right to petition.”27 As the next Part illustrates, the history of petitioning 
reveals two vital interests that underly the right to petition: allocating access 
to lawmakers and providing lawmakers with broad and inclusive 
information.28 As we will see, these interests drove the development of 
petitioning as a solution to the institutional challenges of democratic 
governance and later in-uenced the rise of our modern lobbying system as 
well.29 Before turning to the history, however, it is worth pausing to examine 
these two interests—access and information—in today’s context. 
This Part examines how access and information interests operate in the 
modern lawmaking process and under our current lobbying system. It begins 
by de+ning access in terms of the attention of lawmakers, a highly scarce 
resource that is necessary to achieve policy outcomes and discusses how that 
attention is allocated among competing groups. Next, it discusses the 
informational needs of lawmakers, the lack of institutional sources of 
information, and the reasons why lawmakers increasingly turn to expert but 
interested lobbyists for needed information. 
A. Allocating Government Access 
Public access to government is vital to representative democracy. Outside 
of formal elections, engagement with lawmakers is the primary means by 
which the public participates in the lawmaking process. Moreover, while 
elections decide who will govern and make policy, ongoing engagement with 
the public is necessary to ensure that the needs and desires of constituents—
including political minorities and the unenfranchised—are represented. 
Demand for access, however, drastically exceeds supply, necessitating some 
system of allocation. But what does it mean to allocate access to government? 
What exactly is being allocated, what interests are implicated, and what 
method does the First Amendment favor? 
When we speak of government access, what we are really referring to is 
the attention of lawmakers and other o.cials. As avenues for speech have 
become cheap and the amount of available information has exploded, 
economists have increasingly focused on attention as an increasingly scarce 
and thus valuable resource.30 Much has been written on the implications of 
 
27 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, $%( U.S. #*&, #&( ("'!!). 
28 See infra Part II. 
29 See infra Section II.C. 
30 See Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organization for an Information-Rich World, in COMPUTERS, 
COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST #*, ('-(! (Martin Greenberger ed., !&*!) (“[I]n 
an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of something else: a scarcity 
of . . . the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention 
and a need to allocate that attention”). 
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attention scarcity for businesses and consumers,31 and for public discourse at 
large.32 The issue takes on a di,erent character, however, when applied to 
lawmakers. A signi+cant body of literature has developed to describe how 
interest groups compete for lawmaker attention and how lawmakers choose 
to allocate their own attention.33 While some models of lobbying describe the 
process as an attempt to buy policy outcomes34 or to provide lawmakers with 
information,35 attention-based models of lobbying focus instead on the e,orts 
of interest groups to capture a lawmaker’s limited attention, which is often a 
necessary +rst step before any information exchange or policy consideration 
can occur.36 Like any scarce resource, the attention of lawmakers is highly 
valuable, and interest groups continue to invest heavily in obtaining it.37 
The allocation of lawmaker attention has real consequences for the 
lawmaking process. The legislative agenda is largely driven by access and 
attention. Long before a vote can be had or a debate held, issues must +rst be 
de+ned and selected for serious consideration, and it is in these early agenda-
setting stages that lawmaker attention is most signi+cant.38 By in-uencing 
 
31 See generally, e.g., TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET 
INSIDE OUR HEADS ("'!%) (describing how shifts in technology and business practices have 
increasingly sought to consume human attention). 
32 See generally, e.g., Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, !!* MICH. L. REV. $(* ("'!)) 
(discussing that accompanying the +ood of speech on the Internet, attention of listeners is scarce). 
33 See, e.g., Austen-Smith, supra note #, at "** (describing a lobbying model in which lobbyists 
make political contributions in order to obtain access, whereupon they in+uence policy outcomes by 
providing valuable information); Cotton, supra note #, at #%& (describing a lobbying model in which 
wealthier interest groups obtain greater access and in which lawmakers grant access strategically to 
engage in political rent-seeking). 
34 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS AND 
A PLAN TO STOP IT )) ("'!!); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, )( AM. 
ECON. REV. )##, )## (!&&(). 
35 See, e.g., Richard Hall & Alan V. Deardor,, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, !'' AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. %&, %& ("''%) (laying out a model of lobbying as one of providing costly information to 
likeminded policymakers in order to promote desired outcomes); David Austen-Smith & John R. 
Wright, Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator’s Vote, & SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE ""&, "#( (!&&") 
(describing lobbying as primarily a form of strategic information transmission to lawmakers). 
36 See, e.g., Christopher Cotton, Competing for Attention: Lobbying Time-Constrained Politicians, 
!) J. PUB. ECON. THEORY %(", %(# ("'!%) (noting that “[d]rafting, introducing, and promoting 
legislation are time consuming” and that lawmakers are “constrained . . . in their ability to learn 
about and implement policy proposals”). 
37 See, e.g., Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to 
Congressional O$cials: A Randomized Field Experiment, %' AM. J. POL. SCI. $($, $$# ("'!%) (-nding 
that lawmakers are three to four times more likely to grant access to political donors than to non-
donors); Langbein, supra note #, at !'$&-%!, !'%! tbl.# (-nding that the cost of lawmaker time ranged 
from /%,('' for less than twenty--ve minutes to /*",#'' for an hour); Richard Hall & Frank Wyman, 
Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, )( AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. *&* (!&&') (assessing the relationship between PAC contributions and access). 
38 See Baumgartner et al., supra note #, at "'! (“Lobbying may have a stronger impact on the 
agenda-setting stage of the policy process, when government o.cials determine which issues merit 
 
")"!] "e Right to Petition as Access and Information !"(# 
how lawmaker attention is allocated, it is possible to amplify certain voices 
and foreclose others.39 Indeed, the priorities of Congress tend to show a 
greater correlation with those of lobbyists than with those of the general 
public.40 Moreover, because lawmaker attention is a prerequisite for change, 
a lack of attention to a given topic operates to entrench the status quo.41 
The attention of individual lawmakers is a highly scarce resource. First and 
foremost, lawmakers are human beings subject to the same constraints and 
demands on attention as the rest of us. Each has only twenty-four hours in a 
day, only a fraction of which can reasonably be directed to the business of 
lawmaking.42 The largest constraint on lawmaker attention, however, is the 
constant need to fundraise.43. The ")") election was the most expensive in 
U.S. history, with spending more than doubling that in ")!$.44 The average 
costs of winning an individual House or Senate race were /!.# million and /!).( 
million, respectively.45 The need to raise ever-increasing amounts of money 
each election cycle means that lawmakers must spend more and more of their 
time and attention soliciting donations.46 There has been no comprehensive 
survey of exactly how much time lawmakers spend on fundraising, but various 
anecdotal sources place the figure for members of Congress at anywhere from 
twenty to eighty percent of a lawmaker’s work week.47 
 
signi-cant attention and which issues can be safely ignored. Attention is a critical but limited 
resource in the policymaking process.”). 
39 Id. (“Lobbying may a,ect whose voices are ampli-ed and whose voices are simply not heard 
when vying for the attention of government o.cials.”). 
40 Id. at "'!-'". 
41 Id. at "'$ (“[D]efenders of the status quo are not trying to attract attention to the policy 
they hope will remain unchanged. . . . In contrast, inattention from members of Congress . . . 
provides few if any bene-ts for sides challenging the status quo.”). 
42 See id. at "'(. (“[E]ven if . . . government ha[s] significant resources of time, staff, and money 
at [its] disposal, these resources are inadequate to the many demands . . . placed upon them. All actors 
in Washington are faced with more issues they could spend time on than they have hours in the day.”). 
43 See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Time Suck: How the Fundraising Treadmill Diminishes Effective Governance, 
(" SETON HALL LEGIS. J. "*!, "*" ("'!)) (discussing in detail the pressures of congressional fundraising). 
44 %&%& Election to Cost '() Billion, Blowing Away Spending Records, OPENSECRETS.ORG, (Oct. 
"), "'"', !:$! PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/"'"'/!'/cost-of-"'"'-election-!(billion-
update [https://perma.cc/H$(N-&U(A]. 
45 See, e.g., Soo Rin Kim, The Price of Winning Just Got Higher, Especially in the Senate, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, (Nov. &, "'!%, $:!' PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/"'!%/!!/the-price-
of-winning-just-got-higher-especially-in-the-senate [https://perma.cc/VU"X-XZGH]. 
46 See generally Torres-Spelliscy, supra note (#. 
47 See CONG. MGMT. FOUND. & SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT., LIFE IN 
CONGRESS: THE MEMBER PERSPECTIVE !& ("'!#), https://www.congressfoundation.org/
storage/documents/CMF_Pubs/life-in-congress-the-member-perspective.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V&TD-FFDB] (surveying twenty-five House members and finding that these members spent 
approximately "'% of their time on campaign fundraising activities); Ryan Grim & Sabrina Siddiqui, 
Call Time For Congress Shows How Fundraising Dominates Bleak Work Life, HUFFPOST (Dec. %, "'!*), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/call-time-congressional-fundraising_n_"("*"&! [https://perma.cc/
KFV"-(CMX] (discussing a memo to incoming House democrats describing a ten-hour workday with 
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Time and attention spent fundraising come at the expense of all other 
legislative tasks.48 Members of Congress, for example, are prohibited from 
fundraising in the congressional offices,49 requiring them to physically move to 
separate office spaces to solicit donations.50 More fundamentally, lawmakers 
engaged in fundraising are limited in their ability to multi-task or pay any 
meaningful attention at all to other matters.51 Fundraising thus reduces the total 
amount of attention that can be devoted to other legislative tasks, such as 
drafting legislation, participating in hearings and debates, and spending time 
with constituents.52 The pressure to raise funds also offers those with money a 
way to cut to the front of the attention line and speak directly with lawmakers.53 
And when lawmakers run out of time to fundraise themselves, lobbyists often 
step in to organize fundraisers on their behalf or to bundle donations from 
 
four hours dedicates to “call time” and another hour dedicated to fundraisers and other campaign 
work); Shane Goldmacher, Former Senate Leader Says Senators Spent Two-Thirds of Time Asking for 
Money, NAT’L J. (Jan. !%, "'!(), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/%#(%#/former-senate-leader-says-
senators-spent-two-thirds-time-asking-money [perma.cc/FP"F-E%HE]; Paul Blumenthal, Leaked 
Memo Tells Senate Candidate to Spend *& Percent of Her Time Raising Money, HUFFPOST (Dec. %, "'!*), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/michelle-nunn-fundraising_n_$%")'!) [https://perma.cc/QR)E-
%))G] (discussing a leaked memo advising Georgia Democratic Senate candidate Michelle Nunn to 
spend up to )'% of her time fundraising); Memorandum from Diane Feldman, President, Feldman 
Grp. to The Nunn Team (Michelle Nunn, Candidate for U.S. Senate) (Dec. &, "'!#), 
https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/"#$")*$!&?accesskey0key*XLZhUlmcqs)zb'ft#xs&allowshare0tr
ue&escape0false&viewmode0scroll [https://perma.cc/BWP#-VX#E]. 
48 See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note (#, at "&#-&% (describing the inability of lawmakers to 
multitask and observing that “expecting someone to legislate and talk on the phone at the same time 
seems a tall—if not impossible—order”). 
49 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of "''", Pub. L. No. !'*-!$$, § #'", !!% Stat. )!, &% ("''") 
(codi-ed as amended at !) U.S.C. § %'*). 
50 See, e.g., Nick Penniman & Wendell Potter, Nation on the Take: Dialing for Dollars in “D.C.’s 
Sweatshops”, HUFFPOST (Apr. "), "'!*), https://www.hu.ngtonpost.com/nickpenniman/nation-on-
the-take-dialin b_&*)*!'%.html [https://perma.cc/BER"-YS#C] (“Former representative Dennis 
Cardoza, a California Democrat, compared his party’s call center to a sweatshop with thirty-inch-
wide cubicles set up for the sole purpose of begging for money.”). 
51 See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note (#, at "&#-"&% (discussing the ability of lawmakers to multi-
task based on recent cognitive science literature). 
52 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign 
Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, &( COLUM. L. REV. !")!, !#!" (!&&() 
(noting that candidates would be able to spend more time in their home district were it not for 
fundraising pressures); Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to 
Campaign Finance Reform, ) HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. "!, ## ("'!() (“The main problem of campaign 
money on the federal level—aside from the huge time commitment for Members of Congress, who 
spend so much time dialing for dollars that there is little time for legislative business—is that is 
skews legislative priorities.”). 
53 See MARTIN SCHRAM, SPEAKING FREELY: FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TALK 
ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS ( (!&&$) (quoting Representative Romano Mazzoli) (“People who 
contribute get the ear of the member and the ear of the sta,. They have the access—and access is it. 
Access is power. Access is clout. That’s how this thing works.”). 
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clients.54 Thus fundraising both exacerbates the scarcity of lawmaker attention 
and operates to allocate that attention disproportionately to the wealthy. 
It is not only the attention of each individual lawmaker that is scarce, but also 
the total amount of available lawmaker attention. As of ")!*, the U.S. House of 
Representatives had one voting member per roughly '(',))) Americans, by far 
the greatest discrepancy among industrialized democracies.55 As the number of 
constituents-per-representative increases, so too does the demand for attention, 
while supply in both the House and Senate have remained static since !%"%.56 
Moreover, as new technologies, industries, and social challenges have emerged, 
the number and complexity of issues faced by Congress has also increased.57 Thus 
there are demands on lawmakers’ attention from both an increasing number of 
constituents and an increasing number of issues. 
Under our current system, the task of allocation is largely left to 
lawmakers themselves, who control their own o.ces and sta,s and decide 
which meetings to take and which issues to consider.58 How, then, should 
individual lawmakers or a body such as Congress allocate access to 
themselves? While our current lobbying system allocates lawmaker attention 
informally and disproportionately in favor of the wealthy and politically 
powerful, the history of formal petitioning o,ers an alternative vision in 
which the legislative agenda is driven by the public, the process is largely 
facilitated by formal channels and institutions, and access is allocated on an 
equal basis to all parties without regard to political power.59 If the First 
Amendment is to be considered a guiding principle, then the Constitution 
seems to favor the latter. 
B. Lawmakers’ Need for Information 
Lawmaking is a complicated process, and in order to do their jobs 
e,ectively, lawmakers require and constantly seek out information.60 
 
54 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note #(, at !!# (“As one lobbyist put it expressly, ‘I spend a huge 
among of my time fundraising . . . A huge amount.’ That behavior has been con-rmed to me by 
countless others, not so eager to be on the record.”). 
55 See Drew DeSilver, U.S. Population Keeps Growing, but House of Representatives is Same Size as 
in Taft Era, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (May #!, "'!)), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/"'!)/'$/#!/u-s-population-keeps-growing-but-house-of-representatives-is-same-size-as-in-
taft-era [https://perma.cc/(UQD-SWPT]. 
56 Id.; see also DAVID C. HUCKABEE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., &$-*&! GOV, HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES: SETTING THE SIZE (#$ (!&&$). 
57 See infra Section II.C. 
58 See McKinley, supra note &, at !"'! (noting that under our current lobbying system Congress 
“spend[s] resources and a,ord[s] informal process to the public”). 
59 See infra Part II. 
60 See Paul Burstein & C. Elizabeth Hirsh, Interest Organizations, Information, and Policy Innovation 
in the U.S. Congress, "" SOCIO. F. !*(, !** ("''*) (noting lawmakers’ “constant search for information”). 
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Generally speaking, lawmakers need two kinds of information: information 
about the political consequences of policy decisions—political information—
and substantive information about particular policy issues—policy 
information.61 In order to e,ectively represent constituents and to improve 
reelection chances, lawmakers have a vested interest in understanding the 
policy preferences of those they represent. This includes knowing which 
issues matter to constituents, how intensely they matter, and which positions 
on those issues the lawmaker ought to take.62 This is true whether a lawmaker 
is interested in representing the interests of their entire constituency or 
simply those of their donors. In order to achieve policy success, lawmakers 
also require technical and policy expertise, particularly in the context of novel 
or highly complex topics.63 Such policy information may take the form of data 
and statistics, but also facts, arguments, and predictions.64 
In order to obtain such information, lawmakers have three options: they 
may obtain the information themselves, request it from a public information-
gathering institution, or rely on outside parties to provide it.65 Given the 
relatively limited resources of lawmakers and their sta,s, the +rst option is 
likely not feasible.66 The second option is more promising, particularly for 
bodies such as Congress, which has at its disposal a bureaucratic workforce of 
thousands of specialized experts spread across various institutions including 
the Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budget O.ce, and 
the Government Accountability O.ce.67 Such bodies are publicly funded and 
provide nonpartisan expert information on a wide variety of topics and are 
frequently utilized by Members and Congressional committees.68 The 
capacity of these bodies, however, has dramatically decreased since their 
 
61 See Bryan S. McQuide, Information & Interest Group Lobbying in Congress: Policy vs. 
Political Information " ("''*) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). 
62 See Burstein & Hirsh, supra note %', at !** ([Lawmakers] want to know their constituents’ 
policy preferences, how much particular issues matter to them, and whether their own actions are 
likely to a,ect constituents’ votes at the next election.”) (internal citations omitted). 
63 See John M. De Figueiredo, Lobbying and Information in Politics, ( BUS. & POL. !"$, !"$ ("''"). 
64 Id. 
65 See, e.g., Lee Drutman and Steven Teles, Why Congress Relies on Lobbyists Instead of Thinking for Itself, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. !', "'!$), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/"'!$/'#/when-congress-cant-
think-for-itself-it-turns-to-lobbyists/#)*"&$ [https://perma.cc/GQ*D-R%UB] (observing that government 
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66 See Hall & Deardor,, supra note #$, at *" (noting the assumption that lawmakers and their 
sta,s have limited capacity to advance their legislative goals). 
67 For a thorough exploration of the Congressional bureaucracy and its role in providing 
Congress with nonpartisan expert information, see Jesse M. Cross & Abbe R. Gluck, The 
Congressional Bureaucracy, !%) U. PA. L. REV. !$(!, !$((-($ ("'"'). 
68 See KELLY, supra note "%, at !'-!". 
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heyday in the !%')s, due in no small part to drastic reductions in legislative 
support sta, in the !%%)s, and have largely not recovered.69 
This leaves the third option—outside support. As the history of formal 
petitioning demonstrates, for hundreds of years the primary means of 
information-gathering by Parliament, colonial assemblies, and Congress was 
the petition process, through which interested parties provided both political 
and policy information to lawmakers.70 More recently, the Administrative 
Procedure Act71 retains a version of this function in the form of notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures, which serves as an invaluable source of 
information for administrative agencies.72 Outside of these formal channels, 
however, the majority of outside information is provided by lobbyists and 
privately-funded research, both of which have grown dramatically over the 
past several decades.73 As Hall and Deardor, explain, one way that lobbyists 
may in-uence the lawmaking process is by identifying friendly lawmakers 
and “subsidizing” their e,orts by providing valuable information related to 
speci+c policy goals.74 Because interest groups tend to be better-resourced 
and more highly specialized than generalist lawmakers or legislative support 
bodies, lawmakers increasingly rely on these groups for information.75 By 
 
69 See BRYAN D. JONES & FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, THE POLITICS OF ATTENTION: HOW 
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the early !&&'s); KELLY, supra note "%, at !! (noting that Congressional support offices such as CRS have 
failed to fully replenish “top level, substantive staff”); Drutman & Teles, supra note %$ (noting that during 
this period, legislative support staff was cut by a third, along with the entire Office of Technology 
Assessment, thus reducing the capacity of Congress to “acquire, process, and analyze information”). 
70 See Section II.B. 
71 $ U.S.C. §§ $$!–$&. 
72 For a thorough discussion of formal petitioning’s in+uence on the historical development of 
the Administrative Procedure Act and notice and comment rulemaking, see Maggie McKinley, 
Petitioning and the Administrative State, !"* YALE L.J. !$#), !$#) ("'!)). 
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74 See Hall & Deardor,, supra note #$, at *"-*% ("''%) (outlining a lobbying model in which 
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order to reduce information-gathering costs and thus subsidize their e,orts). 
75 See Clare Brock, Partisan Polarization and Corporate Lobbying: Information, Demand, and 
Con#ict, !' Int. Grps. & Advoc. (forthcoming "'"!) (noting lawmakers’ increased demand for 
information from lobbyists); TIMOTHY M. LA PIRA & HERSCHEL F. THOMAS III, REVOLVING 
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providing information favorable to their desired outcomes, interests groups 
are able to exert considerable in-uence on the lawmaking process,76 
particularly where nobody is funding information in support of the opposing 
viewpoint.77 This is possible because both political and policy information are 
often di.cult and costly to obtain. Constituent preference data, for example, 
is often limited or nonexistent at the local level,78 and detailed technical 
information, economic modeling, or empirical studies may require substantial 
investment to produce. 
Due in no small part to the increasing demands on their attention, 
lawmakers +nd themselves subjected to a constant deluge of information 
from a range of interest groups vying for in-uence. Because of their limited 
attention, however, it is impossible to fully consider all or even most of this 
information, and the task of lawmakers quickly becomes one of sorting 
through massive amount of information—much of it produced by groups with 
a vested interest—in order to determine policy priorities and make 
substantive decisions.79 Missing or lost in this information tsunami are the 
voices of groups with fewer resources and the judgment of disinterested 
experts, both of which are highly relevant to policy decisions. The increasing 
reliance of lawmakers on lobbyists undermines their ability to represent 
constituents and make well-informed decisions by forcing them to operate on 
skewed and incomplete information. 
As this Part illustrates, access and information interests have signi+cant 
implications for democratic government and the lawmaking process. How 
lawmakers allocate their own attention a,ects whose voices are heard and 
what issues are addressed.80 Likewise, what information lawmakers obtain 
and who they obtain it from a,ects legislative outcomes and provides key 
opportunities for in-uence.81 These are institutional issues in need of 
institutional solutions. At present, however, those solutions are lacking. The 
task of allocating lawmaker attention is largely left to lawmakers themselves,82 
 
76 See Hall & Deardor,, supra note #$, at *% (“Lobbyist’s [provision of information] are the 
very mechanism of their in+uence.”). 
77 See Drutman & Teles, supra note %$ (arguing that even lawmakers who are suspicious of 
information provided by lobbyists may be unlikely to push back due to a lack of information). 
78 See Philip J. Ardoin & James C. Garand, Measuring Constituency Ideology in U.S. House Districts: 
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79 See, e.g., KELLY, supra note "%, at ( (noting the sharp increase in the information that Members 
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80 See supra Section I.A. 
81 See supra Section I.B. 
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and the capacity of public information-gathering institutions is unable to 
keep pace with the informational needs of lawmakers.83 As a result, lawmakers 
continue to rely on and provide access to lobbyists whose interests do not 
align with those of the public.84 With these contemporary issues in mind, we 
now turn to history to examine how petitioning and the right to petition 
emerged as an institutional solution to address these same issues. 
II. THE HISTORICAL RIGHT TO PETITION 
The challenges associated with allocating government access and obtaining 
lawmaker information are not new. Long before lawmakers and the public 
turned to lobbyists, the formal petition process was the primary means by which 
both needs were met.85 This Part explores the historical background of the right 
to petition through the lenses of allocation and information and argues that both 
have played pivotal roles in the development and evolution of the right. 
Historically, the right to petition was a highly egalitarian civil right that 
was extended nearly universally, even to the unenfranchised, and established 
a formal mechanism by which individuals and groups could submit their 
concerns to lawmakers with the expectation that those concerns would be 
heard and considered on equal footing.86 The right to petition was also 
justi+ed and defended for its value as a source of information to the 
government, and for centuries was one of the primary means by which 
lawmakers obtained the political and policy information necessary to govern 
e,ectively.87 These interests drove the development of formal petitioning, 
and when the formal institutions that supported petitioning faltered in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they also spurred the rise of the 
lobbying industry, which has unfortunately failed to meet these needs.88 
A. Historical Petitioning as Access 
Access to lawmakers is a valuable and scarce resource, and its allocation 
has important implications for the lawmaking process. While today interested 
parties struggle to be heard amidst a cacophony of other voices, historically 
 
83 See KELLY, supra note "%, at (. 
84 See, e.g., Kimball et al., supra note #, at !' (comparing the public’s policy priorities with those 
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85 See, e.g., McKinley, supra note &, at !!$( (noting that at the time of the First Congress, “the 
petition process constituted the primary means by which individuals and loose associations engaged 
in the lawmaking process”). 
86 See infra Section II.A. 
87 See infra Section II.B. 
88 See infra Section II.C. 
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those seeking redress from their government had to contend not only with 
competing interests, but also with the physical obstacle of transporting one’s 
message—either personally or in writing—to the proper authority.89 Then, as 
now, it was not enough to merely bring a grievance; for it to have any e,ect 
a petition also had to be heard, which required some a.rmative action on the 
government’s part. This Section traces how Parliament, the colonial 
assemblies, and the early Congress addressed the challenge of allocating 
lawmaker attention by formalizing access, adopting policies of receiving and 
hearing all petitions on equal footing, and establishing institutional 
mechanisms to support the steady -ow of petitions. 
The right to petition arose out of a crisis of access. In !"!#, a group of English 
barons, displeased with King John’s reign,90 sought an audience to air their 
grievances and to petition the King to confirm the charter of rights issued by his 
predecessor, Henry I.91 Over the next two years, negotiations were marked by 
stalemate and threats of rebellion by the barons, culminating in the barons’ 
capture of the city of London in !"!&.92 Backed into a corner, King John agreed 
to meet with the barons a few weeks later, whereupon he signed the Magna Carta 
in exchange for the barons’ promises of loyalty and financial support.93 
The Magna Carta established the right to petition in two senses. The +rst 
is that the document was itself a petition,94 one that by its very signing set a 
precedent that the King could be compelled by his subjects to listen and to 
act.95 The second is that the Magna Carta explicitly granted the barons a right 
to petition the King for grievances.96 Realizing the Magna Carta’s promise of 
 
89 See Mark, supra note !%, at "!%$ n.## (“Quite apart from political distance, physical distance 
and rudimentary transportation made frequent or regular appearances before the King quite di.cult 
for all but the most local.”). 
90 See BRYCE LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 
#!"-!$ ("d ed. !&)') (laying out the more salient reasons for the barons’ displeasure). 
91 J.C. HOLT, THE MAKING OF MAGNA CARTA #*-#& (!&%$). 
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treatment, see NICHOLAS VINCENT, MAGNA CARTA: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION $(-*! ("'!"). 
93 See Spanbauer, supra note !#, at ""-"# (“In June of !"!$ the barons, as representatives of the 
nobility, were granted a personal audience with the King at Runnymede to present their written 
petition in exchange for their promise to -nance the government.”). 
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95 See LYON, supra note &', at #"# (noting that “John’s capitulation proved that kings could be 
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of the fundamental principle that there was a body of law above the king”). 
96 MAGNA CARTA, para. %! (!"!$) (Eng.), reprinted and translated in ARTHUR E. 
SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF 
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of the peace or of this security, and, notice of the o,ense be given to four barons . . . the said four 
barons shall . . . petition to have that transgression redressed without delay.”) 
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access, however, would prove more di.cult, in part because the only 
mechanism for enforcement was for the barons to take up arms and compel 
the King by force for every violation.97 In the absence of a clear mechanism 
for obtaining access, money +lled the void, and by the early fourteenth 
century a sort of pay-for-play system had emerged in which the Crown 
considered petitions in exchange for o,ers to fund the government.98 As the 
+nancial needs of the Crown increased, the number of petitions that were 
accepted increased as well,99 and promises of funding soon became a standard 
practice by which nobility and burgesses alike obtained access.100 
These petitions were heard by the King’s counselors and other nobles who 
were called together periodically in what were then referred to as 
“parliaments.”101 As the volume of petitions increased, this institutional 
apparatus grew in size and complexity, eventually culminating in the formal 
and independent Parliament familiar to us today.102 By the early fourteenth 
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segments of society, including knights and burgesses, were also granted audiences by the Crown . . . .”). 
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bureaucracy, coupled with the emergence of Parliament as a governing institution independent of 
the Crown, the status and frequency of petitioning blossomed.”); Smith, supra note !%, at !!$$ (“The 
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century under King Edward III, it was common practice to open Parliament 
by declaring the King’s willingness to consider petitions,103 and clear 
mechanisms were developed for sorting petitions and referring them to 
di,erent parts of the government for resolution.104 By the sixteenth century, 
petitions largely drove the legislative agenda in the House of Commons105 
with distinct processes mediating consideration and referral of petitions,106 
along with a Committee of Grievances tasked with this express purpose.107 
Increased demands for access to lawmakers were thus resolved through the 
creation of formal procedures and institutional supports. 
Through formalization and institutionalization, the right to petition 
became concrete, a,ording petitioners real and meaningful access.108 While 
the King could refuse to act on a petition, he and his counsellors were 
nonetheless obliged to read all petitions that were received.109 This guarantee 
of consideration—of attention—was a de+ning characteristic of the right to 
petition as understood by the King and his subjects.110 One reason this came 
to be was the quasi-judicial nature of petitions.111 Because petitions sought 
redress for both public and private grievances,112 many took the form of 
 
!#, at "# (“[The petitioning process] ultimately led to the development of Parliament, whose advice 
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STUBBS, supra note !'!, at ")%, %"# (noting that “the machinery for receiving and considering such 
petitions as came from private individuals or separate communities was perfected” under Edward I, 
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most e,ective method of calling attention to a grievance”). 
109 Id. at "!%) (noting that “subjects came to expect that their petitions would be received and heard”). 
110 See id. at "!%)-*' (discussing the expectation that all petitions would be received and heard 
and how this re+ected a “web of mutual obligation” by which the people recognized the legitimate 
authority of the Crown to grant petitions in exchange for the King’s acknowledgment of his own 
duty to hear his subjects). 
111 See Colin Leys, Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, # POL. STUD. ($, ($ 
(!&$$) (“It is clear that originally petitioning was a quasi-judicial institution.”); Mark, supra note !%, 
at "!%) (noting that Parliament’s sense of obligation to hear all petitions “can be explained in part 
by the quasi-judicial origins of the instrument and the quasi-judicial role of Parliament”). 
112 See Mark, supra note !%, at "!%%-%* (describing both public and private petitions in England). 
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disputes which might be resolved by either a court or a private bill.113 
Parliament, however, drew no formal distinctions between petitions for 
public grievances and those seeking private redress, and so treated all the 
same.114 Another reason was that Parliament had come to condition funding 
on the King’s consideration and redress of petitions.115 As a result, not only 
did the King have a +nancial incentive to respond to petitions,116 but 
Parliament also had a political incentive to accept more petitions to expand 
its own power.117 Over time, the consistent practice of considering all 
petitions evolved into a sense of obligation on the part of the government.118 
As petitioning became more formal and institutionalized, the access it 
provided became more egalitarian. While the +rst petitions were largely 
secured by nobility,119 by the thirteenth and fourteen centuries a wide range 
of players participated in the petitioning process, including merchants, 
scholars, and even groups who lacked the right to vote, such as prisoners.120 
In the seventeenth century, the right to petition was designated as an 
individual right by King James I,121 and subsequently a.rmed as a 
constitutional right by the English Bill of Rights following the Glorious 
Revolution of !$**.122 Unlike political rights—such as voting—which were 
reserved to certain classes, the right to petition was a civil right which was 
extended to all.123 Thus, through the petition process, the attention of 
 
113 See id. at "!%) (describing the quasi-judicial nature of petitions, including those seeking 
private redress). 
114 See id. (noting that public and private petitions “took the same form” and “were treated in 
a similar fashion”). 
115 See id. at "!%$ n.#! (“[W]hen the King convened Parliament to obtain funds, Parliament 
conditioned the provision of funds on the granting of petitions.”). Moreover, King Henry V agreed 
in !(!( to refrain from enacting legislative responses to petitions contrary to Parliament’s wishes. Id. 
116 See id. at "!%$, n.#! (“Thus the King was usually, though not always, left to devise methods 
to implement the requested redress.”). 
117 See id. at "!%*-%) (“Parliament thus had an interest in considering all petitions because any given 
grievance could ground an attempt to increase Parliament’s power at the expense of royal authority.”) 
118 See supra note !!'. 
119 See supra notes &)–!'' and accompanying text. 
120 See Mark, supra note !%, at "!%&-*' (listing several groups that engaged in petitioning during this 
period and noting that “an extremely wide band of English society participated in politics by petitioning 
for redress of grievances, without question a wider spectrum of society than that with the franchise”). 
121 See $ PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND app. ccxiii (!)'&) (Proclamation of July !', 
!%"() (granting “the Right of his Subjects to make their immediate Addresses to him by petition”). 
122 See Smith, supra note !%, at !!%' (noting that the Glorious Revolution of !%)) led to “the 
Bill or Rights that fully con-rmed the right of petition as an element of the British constitution”); 
BILL OF RIGHTS of !%)&, para. "# (Eng.) (“That it is the right of the subjects to petition the king, 
and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal . . . .”) 
123 See McKinley, supra note &, at !!)" (noting the distinction between political and civil rights 
and observing that in nineteenth-century America, political rights included “the rights to votes, to hold 
public office, and to serve on juries,” while civil rights included “a broad range of rights and freedoms, 
including the freedom of speech, freedom to worship, the right to contract, the right to hold property, 
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Parliament and the Crown could be captured, at least momentarily, by nearly 
any subject of England, regardless of wealth or political power. 
The story of the right to petition in England o,ers insights into 
contemporary e,orts to allocate government access. Initially, the right was 
abstract and unenforceable, accompanied by neither a way to oblige the King 
nor a clear system for how access would be granted or obtained.124 From there, 
an informal and money-driven system of in-uence emerged, one that 
disproportionately favored elites (the parallels to our current lobbying system 
should be apparent by now).125 Over time, however, as formal channels and 
institutions were established to support the petitioning process, the right to 
petition grew more egalitarian, resulting in a quasi-procedural right of access 
accompanied by guarantees of consideration and response.126 
It was this version of petitioning that crossed the Atlantic and took root 
in America. Colonial charters secured the right to colonists127 and colonists 
regularly petitioned colonial assemblies,128 which in turn received and 
referred these petitions to committees on equal footing.129 More importantly, 
the colonies—themselves an unenfranchised minority unrepresented in 
Parliament—depended on petitioning as a means of securing access to the 
Crown.130 To understand the importance the colonists placed on the right to 
 
and the right to sue and be sued”); Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, "$ LOY. L.A. L. REV. !"'*, !"')-!' (!&&") (noting the same distinction). 
124 See supra notes &*–!'' and accompanying text. 
125 See supra Section I.A. 
126 See supra notes !')–!"# and accompanying text. 
127 See Mark, supra note !%, at "!*( (“[English colonists] understood petitioning as the 
foundation of politics and of individual and collective participation in politics, warranting the highest 
degree of protection.”); Don L. Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances: 
Constitutional Development and Interpretation (% (August !&*!) (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech 
University), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi0!'.!.!.)&&.*!*&&rep0rep!&type0pdf 
[https://perma.cc/*Z&H-DZSV] (“[C]ontent analysis of the colonial charters shows that petition 
appears, either specifically or as one of the ‘ancient liberties’ of Englishmen, in over fifty provisions.”). 
128 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note !'", at !'$-'* (noting the prevalence of petitioning and 
their central role in the lawmaking process); Mark, supra note !%, at "!*%-*) (noting that “many of 
the colonial assemblies explicitly a.rmed the colonists’ right to petition” and citing examples of 
contemporary exercise of the right); Higginson, supra note !%, at !($ n.!' (noting the prevalence of 
colonial petitioning and observing that “between !*$' and !)'' the [Virginia] legislature received 
on average over "'' petitions per session”). 
129 See RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING 
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA #"-#( (!&*&) (noting that from !*''-!)'' the membership 
on the Virginia Committee of Propositions and Grievances increased dramatically from ten 
members to !*#, constituting nearly every member of the legislature); MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, 
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES "!' (!&(#) (“All assemblies expected 
petitions, and many resorted to the committee as a method of dealing with them.”). 
130 See Smith, supra note !"*, at $*-%) (noting repeated petitions from colonial government to 
Parliament in response to, among others, the Sugar Act of !*%(, the proposed Stamp Act of !*%$, 
the Townshend Acts of !*%*, and the Intolerable Acts of !**(, the last of which would eventually lead 
to the -rst Continental Congress). 
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petition, one need look no further than the Declaration of Independence, 
which concludes its list of grievances by noting that “[i]n every stage of these 
Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our 
repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury.”131 Indeed, 
prior to the Declaration, the Continental Congress twice petitioned King 
George III and was twice ignored.132 The colonists’ outrage re-ects both the 
importance of petitioning during this period and the contemporary 
understanding that the right did not merely protect a particular form of 
political expression but also included an expectation of consideration and 
response—i.e., access.133 
Following independence, the right to petition persisted. While the Articles 
of Confederation mention the right only with respect to states,134 the individual 
right was expressly protected by a majority of state constitutions135 and was 
included among the amendments proposed by James Madison in !'*% that 
ultimately became the Bill of Rights.136 The right to petition produced relatively 
little debate during discussions in Congress over the First Amendment, so 
entrenched was it by that point that its inclusion as a component of the new 
representative structure would have been obvious and non-controversial.137 
Two elements stand out from the historical record, however, and provide 
some insight into the right’s intended scope and function. The +rst was the 
decision to protect the right to petition the entire government, as opposed to 
 
131 The Declaration of Independence para. ( (U.S. !**%). 
132 See ! JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, !**(-!*)&, at !!$–"" (Oct. "$, !**() 
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., !&'() (petition to King); id. at %#–*" (Oct. !(, !**() (resolution 
protesting Parliament’s interference with right of petition); " JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, !**(-!*)&, at !$)-%" (July ), !**$) (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., !&'$) (petition to 
King). The -rst of these petitions was “neglected” by Parliament, while the second, the “Olive 
Branch Petition,” was formally refused by the King. See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: 
MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE "#–"$ (!&&*). 
133 See Higginson, supra note !%, at !$$–$%. 
134 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of !*)!, art. IX, paras. "-#. 
135 See Smith, supra note !"*, at %*-%) (locating an explicit right to petition in the original state 
constitutions of North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Georgia, as well as the protection of the right by Virginia, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut, noting that only Delaware, New York, and South Carolina “failed to make provision 
for the protection of petition”). 
136 See ! ANNALS OF CONG. (('–%) (!*)&) (Joseph Gales ed., !)#(). 
137 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note !'", at !'& (noting that the right to petition “would have been 
viewed at the time as self-evident, a total non-issue”); Richard R. John & Christopher J. Young, Rites of 
Passage, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE !*&'S: PETITIONING, LOBBYING, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT !'# (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., "''") [hereinafter HOUSE & 
SENATE] (“In the Federalist era, the right to petition was relatively non-controversial—enjoying, as it 
did, an honored place in English constitutional law.”); McKinley, supra note &, at !!(* ("'!%) (“Given the 
ubiquity of the practice in eighteenth-century America, it was taken for granted that the U.S. 
Constitution would include the right to petition in its later-added Bill of Rights.”). 
!"&$ University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !$%: !"#& 
merely the legislature.138 This choice re-ected British and colonial practice 
and also provided a means of petitioning government o.cials not otherwise 
accountable to citizens via the electoral process.139 The second was Congress’ 
rejection of a right to instruction, which would have bound representatives to 
the will of the electorate.140 While this rejection was likely motivated in part 
by practical considerations and the desire for legislative independence,141 its 
e,ect was to distinguish the right to petition from the electoral process: while 
electoral majorities would determine representation, all petitioners had a 
right to reception and consideration of their petitions, regardless of political 
power or majority status.142 
During the early years of the Republic, the right to petition was 
considered highly important,143 and from the beginning petitioning operated 
to allocate lawmaker attention and drive the legislative agenda. Even before 
the passage of the First Amendment, Congress received hundreds of 
petitions,144 and by !'%& the number of petitions had swelled such that one 
contemporary newspaper remarked that “[t]he principal part of [Congress’s] 
time has been taken up in reading and referring petitions.”145 These petitions 
went far beyond private grievances and addressed matters including 
commerce,146 public credit,147 the organization of the federal government,148 
and the institution of slavery.149 Each was formally received by Congress and 
 
138 See Spanbauer, supra note !#, at (' (“The most signi-cant change to the amendment for the 
right to petition was the substitution of the word ‘government’ for the word ‘legislature.’”). 
139 See id. (discussing “a broad vision of petitioning”). 
140 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, !'' YALE L.J. !!#!, !!$(-$% (!&&!) 
(noting the First Amendment’s rejection of a right to instruction and distinguishing instruction 
from petitioning). 
141 See McKinley, supra note &, at !!$" (noting that a right to instruction would “disrupt[] the 
deliberative and independent lawmaking process envisioned by Article I.”). 
142 See id. at !!&# (“The history of petitioning and the speci-c text of the Petition Clause 
counsel against con+ation of the electoral and the legislative processes.”). 
143 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW "$ (!&&() (“First and foremost was the right to vote . . . . Next in 
importance . . . was the right to petition . . . .”). 
144 See William C. diGiacomantonio, Petitioners and Their Grievances: A View from the First 
Federal Congress, in HOUSE & SENATE, supra note !#*, at #! (noting that the -rst Congress received 
“more than six hundred petitions”). 
145 See David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance of the Right of 
Petition, & LAW & HIST. REV. !!#, !!* (!&&!). 
146 See diGiacomantonio, supra note !((, at #! (noting various petitions submitted to Congress 
regarding trade policy, including the very -rst petition, which was submitted by the “tradesmen, 
manufacturers, and others of Baltimore”). 
147 See id. at #$ (noting several petitions concerned with Congress’s management of the national debt). 
148 See id. at ((-(% (describing petitions regarding the location of the federal capital and the 
federal courts, the management of the post o.ce, and an investigation into the actions of a sitting 
member of Congress). 
149 See id. at #%-#) (noting several abolitionist petitions submitted to the -rst Congress). 
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then referred to particular committees or to the executive branch.150 As in 
England and the colonial assemblies, the +rst Congress heard and considered 
petitions from all, including unenfranchised groups such as women, Blacks, 
and Native Americans.151 
The right to petition was not just formally egalitarian; it was practically 
so. The only requirement to be heard was the cost of drafting and +ling a 
petition, and while there were certain formal requirements not unlike court 
+lings,152 and lawyers were occasionally hired to assist with drafting and 
+ling,153 these minor obstacles likely did not exclude would-be petitioners 
from exercising their rights.154 For decades, it was standard procedure for 
petitions to be formally presented to Congress and then referred to an 
appropriate committee155 or to an appropriate executive agency.156 This 
process continued well into the !*#)s and !*()s, whereupon a Congress 
divided upon the issue of slavery passed a series of resolutions limiting 
 
150 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COM., &&TH CONG., PETITIONS, MEMORIAL AND 
OTHER DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS, MARCH *, !*)& TO 
DECEMBER !(, !*&$, at #%!-#%" (Comm. Print !&)%) (listing various committees and executive offices to 
which petitioners were referred). 
151 See McKinley, supra note &, at !!$"-$# (noting that women and Native Americans were 
among the petitioners heard by the -rst Congress); Mark, supra note !%, at "!)" (describing various 
unenfranchised groups, including men, women, Blacks and Native Americans, who made use of the 
petition process). 
152 See, e.g., Mark, supra note !%, at "!*! (describing the formal requirements of seventeenth 
century petitions, including address speci-cations). 
153 See Je,rey L. Pasley, Private Access and Public Power: Gentility and Lobbying in the Early 
Congress, in HOUSE & SENATE, supra note !#*, at %" (providing examples of attorneys hired to assist 
with various petitions). 
154 It is worth noting that it would have been easy for lawmakers to make petitioning more 
di.cult and thus exclude certain groups from participating. See Mark, supra note !%, at """' (noting 
a nineteenth century requirement that conditioned Congress’ consideration of petitions on them 
being “signed only or primarily by those legitimately allowed to request a redress of grievances,” a 
requirement whose practical e,ect was to “delimit the sphere of individuals” who could participate, 
including free Blacks, women, and other marginalized groups during the “gag-rule” period of 
congressional backlash to a wave of anti-slavery petitions). The general trend, however, has been 
towards fewer requirements. Id. at """) (describing how petitions grew less formal during the 
twentieth century). 
155 See Frederick, supra note !($, at !!) (“[T]he normal practice in the decades between the 
rati-cation of the -rst amendment and the debates of the !)#'s was for Congress to receive petitions 
and refer them to committees.”); John P. Nields, Right of Petition, in LECTURES ON HISTORY AND 
GOVERNMENT: SERIES ONE !&"#-!&"(, at !#$ (Univ. of Del. Dep’ts of Hist. & Pol. Sci. !&"() 
(“[D]own to !)#( the custom or procedure in Congress was to receive, hear and then refer petitions 
to appropriate committees.”). 
156 See RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE 
PERIOD BEFORE !)"$, at !#$ (!&!*) (noting that “Congress seemed to feel that the head of a 
department would answer [petitions] just as well as a committee” and providing examples of 
petitions referred to cabinet members in the !*&'s). 
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consideration of petitions on the subject.157 While some point to these so-
called “gag rules” as the end of the formal petition process,158 more recent 
scholarship reveals that Congress continued to receive and respond to 
petitions well into the twentieth century.159 
The formal petition process addressed the challenge of allocating access 
to lawmakers by extending the right to petition as broadly as possible and by 
receiving and considering all petitions on equal footing. This practice 
generated an enormous volume of petitions,160 and the petition process time 
and again responded by establishing formal institutions such as committees 
to manage the workload.161 As we will see, it was only when these institutions 
were no longer able to support the needs of the government that formal 
petitioning began to decline.162 
B. Historical Petitioning as Information 
While petitioning’s ubiquity and longevity may in part be explained by 
its value to petitioners, petitioning also functioned as a primary means of 
gathering information, highlighting important issues, and facilitating 
e,ective governance. In the thirteenth century, King Edward I embraced 
petitions as a means of exercising greater authority over local a,airs,163 and 
 
157 See CONG. GLOBE, "%th Cong., !st Sess. !$' (!)(') (noting the House of Representatives 
statement that it would no longer receive petitions or resolutions “praying the abolition of slavery”); 
Higginson, supra note !%, at !$)-!%" (describing Congress’s response to aggressive abolitionist 
petitioning and the passage of the “gag rules”). 
158 See Higginson, supra note !%, at !%$ (ascribing the “abrupt defeat” of petitioning to its 
“misfortune [of becoming] inextricably entangled in the slavery crisis”); Gary Lawson & Guy 
Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, &# NW. U. L. REV. *#&, *$! (!&&&) (“The so-called gag 
rule . . . brought this era of petitioning to an end.”). 
159 See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American Democracy, )% 
N.Y.U. L. REV. !, #"-#$ ("'!!) (noting the gag rule’s overstated impact); John & Young, supra note !#*, 
at !#*-#) (noting that from the !)#'s to the !&!'s, “the papers of the House and Senate contain hundreds 
of thousands of petitions on an extraordinary range of topics”); Benjamin Schneer, Representation 
Replaced: How Congressional Petitions Substitute for Direct Elections !) (Sept. !", "'!$) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (analyzing data on petitioning rates from !))!–!&(&). 
160 See, e.g., Mark, supra note !%, at ""!(-!$ (noting several accounts of the massive number of 
petitions -led in colonial assemblies while also noting that these -gures have perhaps been 
overstated by historians). 
161 See id. at ""!( (noting that solutions to increased petitioning “replicate themselves from 
body to body, from medieval Parliament through late eighteenth-century colonial assemblies” and 
noting committees in particular). 
162 See infra Section II.C. 
163 See GWILYM DODD, JUSTICE AND GRACE: PRIVATE PETITIONING AND THE ENGLISH 
PARLIAMENT IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES #" ("''*) (noting that Edward I is likely to have viewed 
petitioning “in positive terms, as an opportunity to promote royal interests and signi-cantly increase 
his own personal authority”). 
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under his reign Parliament began to convene regularly to hear them.164 By 
providing redress to local grievances, the Crown could keep tabs on its 
servants, increase its legitimacy, and govern e,ectively at a local level.165 The 
Crown’s interest in local information is evident not only from its ongoing 
acceptance of petitions but also from its direct solicitation of information on 
local matters.166 As Gwilym Dodd observes, “It was not enough for a 
petitioner simply to state that he had a grievance to be resolved; he had to 
provide enough detail to make it incumbent upon the Crown to pursue the 
case and reach a judgement [sic].”167 To this e,ect, petitions during this period 
often contained speci+c details as to persons, times, dates, geographical 
details, land transactions, legal claims, and judicial proceedings.168 
Over time, the informational dimension of petitioning became a major 
justi+cation for treating petitioning as a civil right, rather than a mere 
practice.169 The !$** Trial of the Seven Bishops—a case that was itself a 
precursor to the Glorious Revolution and the inclusion of the right to petition 
in the English Bill of Rights—is instructive on this point. King James II, the 
Catholic head of the Protestant Church of England, issued a Declaration of 
Indulgence suspending religious penal laws and ordered the clergy to read 
the Declaration from the pulpit.170 This order was widely protested,171 and the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, along with six other bishops, submitted a petition 
 
164 See id. at ""-"# (noting that under Edward I, Parliament “fitted into a set pattern of regular 
meetings” to handle the “constant stream” of petitions from localities). Under King Henry III, these 
meetings had been carried out on an ad-hoc basis, usually prompted by the need for taxation or 
information. Id. (noting that these meetings “were determined by the crown’s occasional need for taxation 
and/or its intermittent desire to consult the political community on important matters of policy” (citing 
R. F. TREHARNE, SIMON DE MONTFORT AND BARONIAL REFORM: THIRTEENTH-CENTURY 
ESSAYS "'& (E.B. Fryde ed., !&)%)). Notably, the first recorded gathering of elected knights by Henry 
III at Oxford in !""* was called to gather information on local sheriffs. See LYON, supra note &', at (!% 
(“The main purpose of the meeting seems to have been to secure information.”). 
165 See DODD, supra note !%#, at ## (“[B]y introducing a legal channel by which men (or 
women) of lesser status could seek redress . . . Edward not only made local government more 
accountable, but in doing so signi-cantly increased the power and control that the Crown wielded 
over its servants.”). 
166 See id. at #"-## (citing instances of Edward I soliciting information on local o.cials’ 
misdeeds); id. at "&$ (noting instances from later reigns of the Crown responding to petitions with 
requests for more information). 
167 Id. at "&$. 
168 See id. at "&%. 
169 See David Zaret, Petitions and the “Invention” of Public Opinion in the English Revolution, !'! 
AM. J. SOC. !(&*, !$!$ (!&&%) (noting that the right to petition was regularly defended in the 
seventeenth century as “freedom of information,” as a means of “[c]onveying information,” and as 
providing for the government’s “better information,” while criticizing those who would refuse to 
hear petitions as “scorn[ing] information” (internal quotes omitted)). 
170 See His Majesty’s Gracious Declaration to All His Loving Subjects for Liberty of 
Conscience (given at Court of Whitehall April !%)* and May !%))), reprinted in !" Howell St. Tr. 
"#(, "#(-#& (!)!"). 
171 See Schnapper, supra note !%, at #!# (“That directive was widely disobeyed . . . .”). 
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explaining why they felt the King’s order was unlawful and requesting that 
they be excused from it.172 The bishops were arrested and charged with 
seditious libel for their petition.173 
It is noteworthy that at this time in England there was no general right to 
freedom of speech.174 The Bishops’ counsel therefore rested its defense on the 
distinct right to petition.175 They raised two rationales for why petitions ought 
to be afforded greater protection. First, they argued that petitioning was the 
primary, if not sole, means by which aggrieved citizens might seek redress—a 
matter of access.176 Second, they argued that petitions were a fundamental 
source of information to facilitate policymaking and prevent the Crown from 
taking wrongful action. In their petition to King James II, for example, the 
Bishops had provided information about a !&&* statute177 that they claimed 
made the King’s Declaration unlawful.178 The Bishops’ counsel cautioned that 
infringing upon the right to petition threatened the free flow of information to 
the Crown, asking Parliament to “suppose that there might be a king of 
England that should be misled . . . should be environed with counselors that 
had given him evil advice . . . [and] would not permit . . . the great men of the 
kingdom to offer the king their advice . . . .”179 In such a situation, the bishops’ 
counsel argued, it was the duty of the Bishops to provide correcting information 
to prevent the King from taking wrongful action.180 The Bishops were 
ultimately acquitted,181 and King James II’s attempt to infringe upon the right 
to petition led both to the right being enshrined in the !$*% bill of rights182 and 
 
172 See The Trial of the Seven Bishops for Publishing a Libel, !" Howell St. Tr. at ("'-"). 
173 Id. at #%&-*'. 
174 See Schnapper, supra note !%, at #!) (“In the late seventeenth century, although the existence 
of a right to petition was widely accepted and understood, there was no comparable recognition of 
any general right of freedom of speech.”). 
175 !" Howell St. Tr. at #%&-*' (arguing that it was “the right of all people that apprehend 
themselves aggrieved, to approach his majesty by petition”). 
176 See id. at #&#-&( (arguing that without the right to petition, “men must have grievances 
upon them, and yet they not to be admitted to seek relief ”). 
177 See An Act for the Uniformity of Common Prayer and Service in the Church, and 
Administration of the Sacraments, ! Eliz. ! ch. " § !$ (!$$)), reprinted in % Statutes at Large !!*, !"' (Danby 
Pickering ed., !*%#) (requiring the clergy to “endeavour themselves to the uttermost of their knowledges, 
that the due and true execution [of the Act] may be had throughout their diocese and charges”). 
178 !" Howell St. Tr at #%( (noting that the !$$) Act made the bishops “special guardians” and that 
James II’s Declaration commanded them to “do an act relating to their ecclesiastical function . . . and how 
could they in conscience do it, when they thought part of the declaration was not according to law?”) 
179 Id. at #%)-%& 
180 Id. at #%$ (arguing that the Bishops had “done nothing but [their] duty”); id. at #%& (asking, 
if the Bishops “humbly apply themselves to the king, and o,er him their advice, where is the 
crime?”); id. at #*! (“For I never thought it, nor hath it ever, sure, been thought by any body else, to 
be a crime to petition the king: for the king may be mistaken . . . .”). 
181 Id. at (#'. 
182 See Schnapper, supra note !%, at #!# (noting that the drafters of the !%)& Bill of Rights were well-
acquainted with the trial, as five of the drafters had themselves served as defense counsel for the bishops.) 
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James II’s deposition.183 In acquitting the Bishops, Parliament recognized the 
role that the right to petition played in preventing the government from 
making decisions based on limited information or information skewed by a 
small circle of counsellors.184 These institutional concerns, prominent in 
seventeenth-century England, remain pressing today.185 
While Parliament relied on petitions to complement its own knowledge 
and expertise, for legislatures in colonial America, petitions played an even 
more essential role as a primary source of information for lawmakers. In 
contrast to members of Parliament, colonial representatives in the early 
eighteenth century were mostly volunteer farmers untrained in law or policy 
who had neither the time nor the expertise to gather information on 
important issues or to develop policies.186 Because they lacked sources of 
knowledge or examples of well-crafted laws from which to work,187 early 
assemblies often produced poorly worded and unworkable legislation.188 Over 
time, however, petitioning became a valuable source of information,189 and as 
the number of petitions increased,190 they began to drive the legislative 
agenda.191 By incorporating information provided in petitions, colonial 
legislatures gauged constituent opinion and facilitated legislation covering a 
 
183 Id. at #!#-!( (noting that the case was “a major step towards the Glorious Revolution and 
the deposing of James II”). 
184 See Schnapper, supra note !%, at #(( (describing Parliament’s recognition of the 
“institutional problem” presented by the restriction of information provided by petitions). 
185 See id. (noting the dangers that might have arisen if libel actions could have been brought 
by “racist southern o.cials” against those complaining of racial discrimination, or if a nominee for 
federal o.ce could have brought a similar action against statements made in testimony during 
Senate con-rmation hearings). 
186 See Higginson, supra note !%, at !$# (“Few representatives were trained as legislators; most 
were farmers, holding short terms of o.ce and busy with private responsibilities. They had neither 
time nor expertise to discover independently the colony’s woes or to determine solutions.”). 
187 See Alison G. Olson, Eighteenth-Century Colonial Legislatures and Their Constituents, *& J. AM. HIST. 
$(#, $(& (“There were few trained lawyers in early colonial society, and hence in the legislatures, 
assemblymen had few precedents to guide them . . . [or] sources of information outside the capital cities.”). 
188 See id. (“Accordingly, they bungled issues by writing impractical or incomprehensible laws. Towns 
were legislated into existence at inappropriate sites; wages were regulated in areas where laborers easily 
moved out onto available farmland; the price of bread was assigned on sizes the bakers did not sell.”). 
189 See id. at $$%-$) (noting the increasing role played by petitions and the information 
provided); Higginson, supra note !%, at !$# (“In communities that lacked developed media or party 
structures and that provided limited su,rage, petitioning supplied vital information to assemblies.”). 
190 See BAILEY, supra note )', at %" tbl.$; Olson, supra note !)*, at $$%-$) 
191 See Olson, supra note !)*, at $$% (estimating that approximately half of all laws passed by 
colonial assemblies during the eighteenth century originated as petitions); BAILEY, supra note )', at 
%(; THOMAS L. PURVIS, PROPRIETORS, PATRONAGE, AND PAPER MONEY: LEGISLATIVE 
POLITICS IN NEW JERSEY, !*'#–!**%, at !*) tbl.*.! (!&)%); ALAN TULLY, WILLIAM PENN’S LEGACY: 
POLITICS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PROVINCIAL PENNSYLVANIA, !*"%-!*$$, at && (!&**). 
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wide range of issues.192 Petitioning also played a signi+cant role in shining a 
light on corruption and o.cial misconduct.193 
Petitions continued to be a source of vital information at the first Congress, 
providing significant levels of detail, and included supporting documents, maps, 
and other data.194 Importantly, the egalitarian nature of petitioning directly 
impacted the information that was available to lawmakers at the Founding. 
Because the right to petition extended further than the right to vote, petitions 
included information from disenfranchised and unrepresented groups such as 
women, Native Americans, prisoners, and enslaved persons.195 Likewise, 
without information in petitions, Congress and colonial legislatures would have 
been unaware of and thus unable to address the needs of poor localities or 
marginalized groups such as orphans, debtors, and the mentally ill.196 The fact 
that petitions were considered irrespective of their source meant that the 
information available to legislators—both the issues raised and perspectives on 
those issues—was also inclusive, reflecting the views of the politically powerful 
and the unenfranchised alike. Thus, the allocation of government access and the 
information available to lawmakers are linked. Parliament, colonial assemblies, 
and the early Congress provided a near-universal right to petition and 
considered all petitions on equal footing. In exchange, petitions provided these 
governments with broad and inclusive information. 
 
192 See Higginson, supra note !%, at !$( (“Information from petitions also led to foundings of 
new towns and counties, settlements of boundary disputes and e,orts at internal improvements.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
193 See id. (“Maladministration or corruption among public agents, excessive taxation, 
injustices perpetrated by courts and misconduct by local o.cials . . . were brought to public 
attention by petitioners’ ire.”). 
194 See diGiacomantonio, supra note !((, at (% (noting the use of additional information in 
petitions). One illustrative example was a petitioning campaign led by Abolitionist Quakers that 
submitting so many petitions that a full House committee was created speci-cally to receive them. 
See William C. diGiacomantonio, “For the Grati+cation of a Volunteering Society”: Antislavery and 
Pressure Group Politics in the First Federal Congress, !$ J. EARLY REPUBLIC !%&, !*& (!&&$) (“[M]ore is 
known about the House committee on the Quaker petitions than about any other committee in the 
First Congress.”). This committee requested “all the [i]nformation they [could] obtain,” and the 
Quakers in response provided a “small library of antislavery literature.” Id. at !*&-)' (quoting Letter 
from John Pemberton to James Pemberton, Feb. !$, !*&', Pennsylvania Abolition Society 
Collection). Id. at !)' n.!* (detailing the many volumes delivered to the House committee). Quaker 
petitioners also crafted and presented their arguments directly to the committee through oral 
testimony, supplemental documents, and feedback on an unpublished draft of the committee’s 
report. See id. at !)!; Pasley, supra note !$#, at %(-%$. 
195 See Higginson, supra note !%, at !$# (“[U]nrepresented groups—notably woman, felons, 
Indians, and in some cases, slaves—represented themselves and voiced grievances through petitions.”). 
196 See id. at !$# (“Public funds to reimburse those who cared for orphans, the sick, or the 
insane, assistance to towns in times of hardship, and protection of debtors all depended upon the 
continual +ow of petitions from individuals and towns.” (citation omitted)). 
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C. Petitioning’s Decline and the Rise of Lobbying 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the formal processes and 
institutions that were characteristic of petitioning gradually eroded, 
providing an opening for the rise of our modern system of lobbying. 197 But 
where the old system allocated access on equal footing, the new system picked 
as its winners those with wealth or political power.198 Similarly, while 
petitioning provided lawmakers with information that was broad and 
inclusive of all voices, the information provided by lobbyists 
disproportionately re-ected powerful interests.199 The most signi+cant 
change, however, was the failure of those institutions within Congress that 
had facilitated petitioning by receiving, referring, and resolving petitions to 
scale alongside the expansion of the federal government.200 Without these 
formal mechanisms for allocating lawmaker access, our modern pay-for-play 
system of informal lobbying emerged to +ll the void. 
This Section tracks the decline of formal petition and the rise of lobbying 
through the lens of access and information and highlights both the post-Civil 
War expansion of the federal government and the inability of antebellum 
institutions to scale accordingly.201 This expansion of government facilitated 
lobbying’s rise in two ways: +rst, an increase in the sheer volume of 
government business created allocative pressures which antebellum 
institutions couldn’t accommodate; second, the complexities of a growing 
nation and economy increased the informational needs of lawmakers who 
came to rely on well-resourced and expert lobbyists. 
One reason why petitioning was so e,ective at allocating government 
access was that, prior to the Civil War, the government’s workload was 
relatively light and there were fewer demands on lawmaker attention.202 After 
 
197 See McKinley, supra note &, at !!$% (noting that “[t]he rise of our modern, ubiquitous lobbying 
culture did not occur until the mid- to late-nineteenth century” and that lobbying only fully 
supplanted petitioning “likely some time during the Progressive Era”); Schneer, supra note !$&, at !#-
!( fig.! (tracking the gradual decline of petitioning during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). 
198 See, e.g., Pasley, supra note !$#, at %! (“Since only the wealthiest institutions and individuals could 
afford such extra representation, the polity seemed to be losing some of its democratic character.”). 
199 See, e.g., David J. Rothman, Politics and Power: The United States Senate !)%&-!&'!, at "'"-
'( (!&%%). 
200 See infra notes "'(–"!! and accompanying text. 
201 Several scholars have identi-ed this period as one in which the petition process began to 
decline. See, e.g., Pasley, supra note !$#, at %'. Other scholars, however, note how petitioning persisted 
in a diminished form well into the twentieth century and how petitioning was incorporated into the 
emerging administrative state. See, e.g., El-Haj, supra note !$&, at #"-#$ (noting the persistence of 
petitioning into the twentieth century); John & Young, supra note !#*, at !#*-#) (same); McKinley, 
supra note &, at !"'! n.(%$ (highlighting how the emergence of the administrative state might factor 
into the historical analysis). 
202 See Pasley, supra note !$#, at %' (“[T]he congressional workload was small enough in the 
!*&'s that a mere paper petition often really was enough to get the government’s attention.”). 
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the Founding, members of Congress had attention to spare, and could thus 
devote meaningful consideration to all manner of petitions, even those from 
individual citizens.203 The workload of Congress following the Civil War, 
however, was vastly di,erent from that of the First Congress; while Congress 
considered just !(' bills in the !'%)s, by the turn of the century it faced more 
than "*,))).204 This increase can be attributed to several factors. First, the 
country was growing both in population and landmass, and Congress’ routine 
responsibilities scaled accordingly.205 Second, the rise of new technologies 
and industries, including railroads, demanded federal entry into areas 
previously handled by state and local governments due to their complexity 
and increasingly interstate nature.206 Third, during this time Congress turned 
its attention to social issues such as education, labor, Native rights, and the 
interests of freedmen, which further expanded its workload.207 
The expansion of the federal government meant not only that Congress 
had more to do, but also that more of it was likely to a,ect the everyday lives 
of constituents who, in turn, sought greater access.208 As a result, members of 
Congress began to face unprecedented demands on their time and 
attention.209 The mechanisms of the formal petition process designed to 
allocate access, however, failed to scale with the increased scope of 
 
203 Id. (“A brief glance through the records shows that Congress was willing to give serious 
consideration to all manner of petitioners, be they major business leaders or obscure citizens . . . .”). 
204 See Margaret Susan Thompson, Corruption—or Confusion? Lobbying and Congressional 
Government in the Early Gilded Age, !' CONG. & PRESIDENCY !%&, !*"-*#, !*# tbl.! (!&)#) (noting 
the various phenomena that led to the increase in Congressional activity). 
205 See id. at !*# (noting that increases in population and the addition of new territories and 
states “led to skyrocketing demands for routine services: post o.ces; law enforcement and judicial 
personnel; revenue, land, pension, and customs agents; internal improvements; and so on”). 
206 See id. at !*( (noting that “Washington had no choice” but to assume oversight of the 
railroad industry given its size and impact). 
207 See id. at !*(-*$ (noting that the Civil War and Reconstruction expanded the “boundaries 
of acceptable public action” and inspired a “popular enthusiasm for public solutions to what formerly 
had been considered private problems,” leading to the creation of the Freedman’s Bureau and the 
Education Department). 
208 See MARGARET SUSAN THOMPSON, THE “SPIDER WEB”: CONGRESS AND LOBBYING 
IN THE AGE OF GRANT !") (!&)$) (noting that during the Gilded Age people “felt the e,ects of 
government more acutely than in the past and consequently cared about and watched its operation 
more closely” and that members of Congress were “deluged with constituent demands” in the form 
of letters, petitions, and direct access). 
209 See id. (noting that pressures facing members of Congress in the Gilded Age “were more 
numerous and probably more intense than those that confronted earlier generations of House 
members”); id. at !#' (“All in all, hundreds of messages would inundate each man in the Capitol. . . . 
[A]ll would be competing for shares of the -nite resources of time, energy, and clout and the 
individual legislator’s command.”). 
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government,210 prompting the aggrieved to seek other means of obtaining 
access—namely, lobbyists.211 
It has often been claimed that lobbying is “probably as old as 
government.”212 As Je,rey Pasley notes, however, formal petitions, like letter-
writing and the publication of newspaper articles, are “not the kinds of 
in-uence . . . that the political term lobbying was invented to describe.”213 
Indeed, as he explains, if we set aside petitions for individual private claims 
and con+ne our de+nition of lobbying to the practice as we know it today—
that is, e,orts at in-uencing public policy by obtaining direct, personal access 
to lawmakers—we +nd relatively few instances of “lobbying” at the time of 
the First Congress.214 While some petitioners hired attorneys to assist them 
in drafting petitions,215 this sort of agent-based petitioning was largely 
con+ned to petitions for individual claims, rather than questions of public 
policy.216 Likewise, while some early petitioners sought direct access to 
lawmakers to advance their claims, there is little to suggest that petitioners 
enjoyed the type of consistent personal access typical of lobbyists today217 or 
that these e,orts at personal access had signi+cant in-uence on the 
lawmaking process.218 
Lobbying persisted, however, and by the time of the Civil War 
professional lobbyists had been around for some time. Their profession, 
however, was marked, then as now, by intense public disdain.219 As early as 
!*&$, the poet Walt Whitman counted “lobbyers” [sic] alongside “bribers, 
compromisers, . . . sponges, . . . policy backers, [and] monte-dealers” and 
 
210 See Henry Brooks Adams, The Session, !!! N. AM. REV. "&, $&-%' (!)*') (“[N]ew powers, new 
duties, new responsibilities [and] new burdens of every sort, are incessantly crowding upon the government 
at the very moment when it finds itself unequal to managing the limited powers it is accustomed to 
wield. . . . The amount of business has become so enormous as to choke the channels provided for it.”). 
211 See Thompson, supra note "'(, at !)' (noting that “[t]raditional channels of communication, 
especially those between legislators and their constituents, were clogged” and that “[i]n their 
impatience, people began to look for ways of breaking through the logjam” and found in lobbyists 
“a marked improvement in their chances for substantive satisfaction”). 
212 Pasley, supra note !$#, at $* n.! (quoting LESTER W. MILBRATH, THE WASHINGTON 
LOBBYISTS !" (!&%#)); see also id. (identifying various other authors making the same assertion). 
213 Id. at $)-$&, %$. 
214 See id. 
215 See id. at %" (noting examples of attorneys hired to assist with petitions across a variety of topics). 
216 Id. 
217 See id. at %#-%( (noting that, despite some “temporary lobbyists” following Congress to seek support 
for their petitions, “there is little evidence of extensive or meaningful contact with members of Congress”). 
218 Id. at %$ (“[T]here is not enough evidence in the petition histories to conclude that much 
of the government’s work or the general direction of public policy was being directed or even heavily 
in+uenced by avowed lobbyists.”). 
219 See Conor McGrath & Phil Harris, The Creation of the US Lobbying Industry, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL MANAGEMENT ('*, (') (Dennis W. Johnson ed., "'')) (describing 
various nineteenth-century accounts of professional lobbyists); " ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE: 
!*)&-!&)&, at (&!, (&* (Wendy Wol, ed., !&&!) (describing more negative contemporary accounts). 
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described them as “crawling, serpentine men, the lousy combings and born 
freedom sellers of the earth.”220 Even where lobbyists had been employed, 
their e.cacy was uncertain at best,221 and their methods questionable.222 
With petitioning’s decline, however, aggrieved parties were left without an 
e,ective means of obtaining access, and thus had little choice but to turn to 
lobbyists, 223 whose costly services made them a viable option only for those 
able and willing to pay.224 
At the same time that Congress’s docket grew larger, it also grew more 
varied and complex, requiring lawmakers to obtain ever more information to 
deal with the issues before them. Members of Congress, however, lacked the 
resources, sta,, or expertise to obtain this information.225 The need for 
information drove members of Congress to embrace lobbyists, who quickly 
became indispensable experts on complex matters, just as it had driven the 
English Crown to embrace petitioning centuries before.226 Indeed, it was 
through the provision of information that lobbyists gained valuable in-uence 
in Washington, with lawmakers seeking out lobbyists for facts to support their 
positions and lobbyists o,ering such information at every opportunity. 227 
 
220 WALT WHITMAN, THE EIGHTEENTH PRESIDENCY! ")–"& (Edward F. Grier, ed.) 
(!)$%); see also Pasley, supra note !$#, at %!. 
221 See ROTHMAN, supra note !&&, at !&" (noting that during the !)*'s, lobbyists appeared 
“careless and haphazard, neither especially benefitting nor endangering Senate proceedings”); id. at 
!&) (noting that the use of lobbyists was “no guarantee of satisfaction”); id. at "'! (“Despite significant 
expenditures and efforts, from the most legitimate to the most questionable, business interests could 
not efficiently prejudice the legislative process.”); BYRD, supra note "!&, at (&( (describing how Tom 
Scott, a railroad operator, employed two hundred lobbyists for the !)*%-!)** Congressional session 
but nevertheless was unable to win support for his railroad and noting how businessmen at the time 
were “not always certain that a lobbyist possessed the influence he claimed”). 
222 See ROTHMAN, supra note !&&, at !&%-"'" (noting that, while “bribery was neither 
permiss[i]ble nor desirable, there were other methods for bestowing favors on potential supporters” 
and describing how lobbyists provided members of Congress with loans, railroad passes, inexpensive 
stock, and jobs). 
223 See Pasley, supra note !$#, at %'-%! (noting that the post-Civil War expansion of government 
made it impossible for lawmakers to devote individual attention to petitions and was a “major cause” 
of the rise of lobbying during this period). 
224 See, e.g., BYRD, supra note "!&, at (&& (describing how obtaining access was practically 
impossible except for those who could afford lobbyists); THOMPSON, supra note "'), at !%$-*# (same). 
225 See BYRD, supra note "!&, at (&* (“Turnover of membership was high; levels of 
parliamentary expertise were correspondingly low. Neither house had formal +oor leadership. There 
was practically no sta,, either for committees or for individual members.”); THOMPSON, supra note 
"'), at ##-%& (making the same assertion). 
226 See ROTHMAN, supra note !&&, at "'# (noting that during the !)&'s, lobbyists provided members 
of Congress with “information that only representatives of particular organizations could gather” and 
helped them “understand the increasingly technical legislation that came before the chamber”). 
227 See id. at "'#-'( (noting that Senators would often seek out pressure groups to bolster their 
arguments and describing a case in which Wyoming Senator Francis Warren solicited information 
on a wool tari, from lobbyists). 
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Over time, members of Congress came to trust that if there was information 
they needed a friendly lobbyist would be there to provide it.228 
Formal petitioning was not eliminated by the rise of lobbying, but it did 
undergo fundamental changes. While in the Founding era petitions had 
sought speci+c forms of redress and might be accompanied by detailed 
information, post-Civil War petitions were often deliberately short—often 
omitting essential details or information for lawmakers, or even a speci+c 
request for relief.229 Instead, these petitions were tools of mass politics 
intended to focus attention on particular issues and to apply political 
pressure—the “sound bites” of the time.230 By the early twentieth century, 
petitions could no longer be relied upon to secure the attention of 
lawmakers,231 and they no longer provided useful information to lawmakers, 
who had come to rely on lobbyists for expertise and public opinion polls to 
learn their constituents’ preferences.232 The role of petitioning has since 
declined to the point where by the !%*)s the House no longer had any formal 
mechanism for receiving or considering petitions.233 
The history of formal petitioning demonstrates that the right to petition 
protects more than a form of political expression. Rather, it protects a 
particular mechanism of representative government and the right of all 
members of society to meaningfully participate in the lawmaking process and 
to be heard by their government. Petitioning made use of formal institutions 
to allocate the public’s access to lawmakers and to provide needed information 
to lawmakers. These interests—access and information—drove the 
 
228 See id. at "'$-'% (noting that “Senators expected lobbyists to supply the necessary facts” 
and that “Senators and lobbyists customarily joined together for their mutual bene-t.”); Thompson, 
supra note "'(, at !*! (noting that during the !)*'s, lobbyists “could be relied upon to be informed 
thoroughly about the issues in the cases they accepted” and that lawmakers “could count on the 
substantive accuracy of what they were told”). 
229 Mark, supra note !%, at """%-"*. 
230 See id. at "!%'-%! (describing petitions during this time as “a tool of democratic mass 
politics, useful in creating political dramas and highlighting legislative deadlocks”); id. at """% 
(noting that post-Civil War petitions “were not instruments of deliberation or persuasion in 
themselves, but rather instruments of mass politics”). 
231 See, e.g., Pasley, supra note !$#, at %'-%! (observing that, while during the !*&'s “a mere 
paper petition often really was enough to get the government’s attention . . . [but t]his kind of 
individual attention to petitions became less possible with the expansion of the government during 
the Civil War”); LEON WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT LIBERTIES !'% (!&"*) (noting that petitions to 
Congress “have proved of no great value in securing legislative action, even when the signers reached 
into the millions as in the case of certain petitions for woman’s su,rage”); Thompson, supra note 
"'(, at !)' (noting that as a result of the expansion of the government, “many who tried to deal with 
Washington became frustrated by the lack of responsiveness they found there”). 
232 See John & Young, supra note !#*, at !#) (noting that public opinion polls provided “more 
systematic techniques for registering public sentiment”). 
233 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COM., supra note !$', at & (“The importance of 
petitioning in the federal legislative process has diminished to the extent that presently no 
mechanism exists for the presentation and consideration of petitions on the +oor of the House.”). 
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development of the right to petition and help to distinguish it from the right 
to free speech. Moving forward, courts and Congress should take these 
interests seriously in crafting a distinct Petition Clause doctrine and new 
mechanisms for public engagement. 
III. THE PETITION CLAUSE DOCTRINE 
This Part excavates the Supreme Court’s Petition Clause doctrine to 
illustrate the role that access and information interests have played in the 
Court’s jurisprudence and to highlight where historical context may serve to 
further inform and develop the doctrine. Despite petitioning’s long history 
and its central role in the lawmaking process for much of American history, 
the First Amendment right to petition did not receive serious attention from 
the Supreme Court until the !%&)s.234 By this time, of course, informal 
lobbying had more or less displaced petitioning as the primary means of 
engaging with lawmakers,235 and it was against this background of informal 
access that these cases were decided.236 Scholars have observed that the 
Court’s early Petition Clause Doctrine does not incorporate petitioning’s 
historical context, and instead relies on textualism.237 As a result, the Court 
has struggled to distinguish petitions from other forms of political speech and 
eventually con-ated the two.238 
Even amidst this conflation, however, there remains hope for the right to 
petition. First, the Supreme Court signaled in its most recent Petition Clause case, 
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, its willingness to consider the history of petitioning 
and to disaggregate the Speech and Petition clauses.239 Second, even without 
historical context, a close reading of the Court’s Petition Clause doctrine reveals 
 
234 See generally United States v. Harriss, #(* U.S. %!" (!&$(); E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., #%$ U.S. !"*, !#*-#) (!&%!); see also McKinley, supra note &, at !!%#-%$ 
(describing Harriss as “the Court’s -rst opportunity for substantive analysis of the right to petition” 
and Noerr as “the -rst case to address the right to petition in any depth”). 
235 See McKinley, supra note &, at !!$% (noting that lobbying likely overtook petitioning 
sometime during the Progressive Era); Schneer, supra note !$&, at !%-!* (noting petitioning’s decline 
during the early twentieth century and attributing this in part to the rise of lobbying). 
236 See McKinley, supra note &, at !!#& (arguing that the Court’s Petition Clause doctrine 
assumes that “lobbying and petitioning are coextensive” in part due to its being crafted “against a 
background of changed circumstances” and a lack of historical context). 
237 Id. at !!%# (noting that Justice Black, in crafting the Noerr decision and other “pillars of our 
Petition Clause doctrine,” applied a textualist approach, rather than one grounded in history); see 
also We the People Found., Inc. v. United States, ()$ F.#d !(', !(& (D.C. Cir. "''*) (Rogers, J., 
concurring) (noting that “[i]t remains to be seen” how the Court would respond to historical 
evidence of petitioning, and that it would “[n]o doubt . . . present an interesting question”). 
238 See McKinley, supra note &, at !!%( (“In the absence of [historical] context, the Court has 
struggled to provide clear and -xed meanings to the Petition clause, often con+ating practices 
historically distinct but termed similarly in modern parlance.”). 
239 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, $%( U.S. "*& ("'!!). 
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that the Court’s reasoning has consistently been informed by the same interests 
that drove the development of petitioning itself—access and information. 
A. The Petition Clause Doctrine as Access 
The Court +rst considered substantively the right to petition in Eastern 
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.240 Noerr involved a 
claim that the railroad industry was engaged in anticompetitive conduct in 
violation of the Sherman Act241 when it sponsored a publicity campaign to 
drum up public opposition to laws that would have favored the trucking 
industry.242 Justice Hugo Black, writing for the Court, dismissed the claims, 
+nding that the Sherman Act, as written, did not apply to this sort of political 
activity.243 Justice Black, however, went on to express his concern that if the 
Sherman Act were read to reach political activity, it would “raise important 
constitutional questions” for the First Amendment and the Petition 
Clause.244 While the Court in Noerr never reached the question of whether 
the railroads’ activity was protected under the First Amendment,245 Justice 
Black’s words have been interpreted to suggest that petitioning includes a 
broad range of activities aimed at political advocacy.246 
This view was later a.rmed in another antitrust case—California Motor 
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.247 The California Motor plainti,s claimed 
that their competitors had engaged in monopolization by -ooding the courts 
and administrative agencies with petitions designed to undermine and drown 
out their own license applications.248 The Court +rst held that the right to 
petition extended to petitions submitted to courts and administrative 
agencies, and that, as in Noerr, the antitrust laws did not preclude groups from 
 
240 #%$ U.S. !"* (!&%!). 
241 Sherman Act §§ !–", !$ U.S.C. §§ !–" (!&)"). 
242 Noerr, #%$ U.S. at !!#. 
243 Id. at !#) (“[W]e think it clear that the Sherman Act does not apply to the activities of the 
railroads at least insofar as those activities comprised mere solicitation of government action with 
respect to the passage and enforcement of laws.”). This holding was a.rmed four years later in 
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, where the Court found that the Sherman Act likewise did not 
reach political activity aimed at the Secretary of Labor and the Tennessee Valley Authority. See #)! 
U.S. %$*, %%'-%!, %*' (!&%$). Notably, the Pennington court did not address the First Amendment or 
the right to petition. 
244 Noerr, #%$ U.S. at !#*-#). 
245 Id. at !#" n.% (“Because of the view we take of the proper construction of the Sherman Act, 
we -nd it unnecessary to consider [the First Amendment] defenses.”). 
246 See McKinley, supra note &, at !!*' (“Justice Black again invoked his understanding of 
petitioning as a practice that spanned broadly to encompass any form of legislative advocacy and 
communication . . . .”). 
247 ('( U.S. $') (!&*"). 
248 Id. at $'&. 
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using these channels.249 Next, however, the Court held that “First 
Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they are used as 
an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute.”250 Thus, attempts 
to abuse the formal administrative and judicial processes to anticompetitive 
ends were not immune from antitrust liability.251 This has come to be known 
as the “sham” exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine under which courts 
decline to grant immunity to petitions “aimed at blocking a competitor’s 
access to government,”252 rather than genuine e,orts at advocacy.253 
California Motor recognized the necessity of protecting equal access to both 
the courts and administrative agencies. In holding that the First Amendment 
protects “the right to access to agencies and courts, within the limits, of course, 
of their prescribed procedures,”254 the Court suggests that formal procedures 
regulating access are both permissible and often necessary to protect the right 
to government access. Moreover, the Court held that, in flooding the courts 
and administrative agencies, the highway carriers had sought to deprive their 
competitors of “free and meaningful access,”255 thereby drawing a distinction 
between “free” and “meaningful” access. While the carriers had not impeded 
the “free[dom]” of their competitors to petition the government, they 
prevented such petitions from being heard, thus rendering them futile and 
meaningless, no less an infringement of the right to petition.256 The Court 
made explicit its concern that powerful interests might seek to use the First 
Amendment’s protections to infringe upon those of others.257 It affirmed the 
principle that First Amendment freedoms do not “sanction repression of that 
[same] freedom by private interests.”258 In the lobbying context, where 
politically powerful interests compete for scarce lawmaker attention, this 
reasoning is particularly resonant and suggests inasmuch as massive lobbying 
 
249 Id. at $!'-!! (“We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition 
to hold that groups . . . may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures 
of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view . . . .”). 
250 Id. at $!(. 
251 Id. at $!# (noting that such actions “cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the 
umbrella of ‘political expression’”). 
252 McKinley, supra note &, at !!*# (citing Cal. Motor, ('( U.S. at $!$-!%) 
253 See Cal. Motor, ('( U.S. at $!$-!%. 
254 Id. at $!$. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. (“A combination of entrepreneurs to harass and deter their competitors from having 
‘free and unlimited access’ to the agencies and courts, to defeat that right by massive, concerted, and 
purposeful activities of the group are ways of building up one empire and destroying another.”). 
258 Id. at $!(-!$ (quoting Associated Press v. United States, #"% U.S. !, "' (!&($)). 
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efforts seek to foreclose meaningful access by other groups they may likewise 
be afforded less protection under the First Amendment.259 
The Court has generally held that, where a formal channel exists, the right 
to petition protects equal access to it.260 Whether the government is under 
any obligation to provide a formal channel, and whether the Petition Clause 
a,ords a right to consideration or response, however, are di,erent stories. 
The Court +rst addressed these questions in Arkansas State Highway 
Employees, Local #$#$ v. Smith.261 Two Arkansas State Highway Commission 
employees, having faced disciplinary action, asked their union to +le a 
grievance on their behalf.262 The commission refused to allow the union to 
+le grievances on behalf of its members, and the union and employees sued, 
arguing that the commission had deprived the union of the right to petition 
under the First Amendment.263 Both the district and circuit courts found for 
the plainti,s.264 The Supreme Court, however, reversed, concluding that “the 
complaint . . . is simply that the Commission refuses to consider or act upon 
grievances when +led by the union rather than by the employee directly,”265 
and that, just as the First Amendment did not guarantee that any petition 
would be persuasive or e,ective,266 it imposed no obligation on the 
government to listen or respond to the union’s petition.267 The government, 
like individuals,268 was free to ignore whatever speech it wanted. 
 
259 The Court has not addressed a situation in which one group has sought to use informal 
lobbying to impede another speci-c group’s right to free and meaningful access. Moreover, the Court 
has yet to address the question of whether lobbying is protected at all under the Petition Clause. 
However, assuming arguendo that lobbying is a protected form of petition, the “sham” exception 
suggests that groups would not be free to use lobbying e,orts to foreclose competitor access. Id. 
260 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, $$) U.S. #!', #$$ ("'!') (discussing the 
right of corporations under the First Amendment to petition administrative bodies); First Nat’l Bank 
of Bos. v. Bellotti, (#$ U.S. *%$, *&", n.#! (“[T]he First Amendment protects the right of corporations 
to petition legislative and administrative bodies.”); Cal. Motor, ('( U.S. at $!'-$!! (holding that the 
right to petition extends to administrative agencies and their “channels and procedures”). 
261 ((! U.S. (%# (!&*&). 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264 Ark. State Highway Emps. Local !#!$ v. Smith, $)$ F."d )*%, )** ()th Cir. !&*)) (citing 
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, #)& U.S. "!*, """-"# (!&%*)) (holding that 
limitations on a union’s ability to seek the assistance of counsel restricts the right to petition). 
265 Smith, ((! U.S. at (%$. 
266 Id. at (%(-%$ (“[The First Amendment] provides no guarantee that a speech will persuade 
or that advocacy will be e,ective.” (quoting Hanover Twp. Fed’n of Teachers v. Hanover Cmty. Sch. 
Corp., ($* F."d ($%, (%! (!&*"))). 
267 Id. at (%$. 
268 In the individual context, the Court has struck down attempts to restrict unwanted speech 
on the basis of an individual’s freedom to ignore it. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., (%# 
U.S. %', *" (!&)#) (“Recipients of objectionable mailings, however, may ‘e,ectively avoid further 
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.’” (quoting Cohen v. California, ('# 
U.S. !$, "! (!&*!)); accord id. (“[T]he ‘short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can . . . 
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The Court faced a similar set of facts years later in Minnesota State Board 
for Community Colleges v. Knight. 269 This case, the converse of Smith, concerned 
a Minnesota statute that required public employers to only negotiate with 
union representatives on certain matters.270 The statute was challenged by a 
group of community college faculty who were barred from participating in 
“meet and confer” sessions in their individual capacities, which they alleged 
violated their right to petition. 271 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, 
upheld the statute and cited Smith for the proposition that the government is 
under no obligation to “listen to any specially a,ected class than it is to listen 
to the public at large. 272 Justice O’Connor also considered what obligation, if 
any, the government had to listen to the public generally. Citing Bi-Metallic 
Investment Co. v. State Board of Education,273 Justice O’Connor argued that, 
just as it would be impractical to recognize a general due process right to be 
heard in all instances, requiring the government to consider all voices under 
the First Amendment would cause the government to “grind to a halt.” 274 She 
also cited several instances in which the government had restricted or limited 
public participation, noting that “[p]ublic o.cials at all levels of government 
daily make policy decisions based only on the advice they decide they need 
and choose to hear.” 275 Recognizing a constitutional right to be heard, in the 
Court’s view, would “work a revolution in existing government practices.”276 
It is notable that Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Knight makes no reference to 
the history of petitioning or the fact that for hundreds of years the right to 
petition included a right to formal consideration and response.277 Indeed, a 
broader view of history suggests that the real revolution in government practices 
was the gradual erosion of formal participation and subsequent exclusion of the 
general public. Such context might also have provided the Court with a limiting 
principle to ensure both the public’s right to consideration and the ongoing 
functioning of government. Justice O’Connor’s reference to executive agencies 
not “permitting unrestricted public testimony”278 calls to mind perhaps the most 
widespread form of modern petitioning—the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
 
is an acceptable burden’” (quoting Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, "%& F. Supp. ))', 
))# (S.D.N.Y.), a! ’d #)% F."d ((& ("d Cir. !&%*), cert. denied #&! U.S. &!$ (!&%)))). 
269 (%$ U.S. "*! (!&)(). 
270 Id. at "*#. 
271 Id. at "*(. 
272 Id. at ")%-)*. 
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274 Knight, (%$ U.S. at ")$. 
275 Id. at ")(. 
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277 See supra Section II.A. 
278 Knight, (%$ U.S. at ")(. 
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notice-and-comment requirements, which permit widespread public input 
limited by formal processes and channels.279 Without such context or a ready 
model for a formal means of public participation, however, the Court saw its 
choice as one between government efficiency and an unrestricted right to be 
heard and chose the former.280 
Knight’s sweeping holding is difficult, however, to reconcile with our 
emerging understanding of historical petitioning. In We the People Foundation, 
Inc. v. United States, the D.C. Circuit considered a claim by an organization 
which had engaged in a widespread effort to petition several government 
officials—including a member of Congress and various parts of the Executive—
requesting “documented and specific” answers to questions regarding a variety 
of public matters, including the tax code, privacy issues, and the government’s 
war powers.281 The plaintiffs claimed that, by ignoring their requests and failing 
to enter into “good faith exchanges,” these government actors infringed upon 
their right to petition.282 While Smith and Knight arose out of the public 
employer context and arguably could have been decided on narrower 
grounds,283 We the People addressed petitioning in its broadest sense. Writing 
for the majority, then-Judge Kavanaugh began by citing Smith and Knight for 
the proposition that individuals have no right to consideration.284 In particular, 
Judge Kavanaugh noted that neither Smith nor Knight hinted at any limitation 
in their holdings to particular types of petition and thus they extended beyond 
the public employment context and governed here.285 
Judge Kavanaugh proceeded, however, to discuss the wealth of historical 
evidence which had emerged in the years following Smith and Knight 
suggesting that the right to petition ought to be understood to include a right 
 
279 See Administrative Procedure Act, $ U.S.C. §§ $$"–$&. 
280 See McKinley, supra note &, at !!** (“[T]he [Knight] Court was unable to envision a more 
limited form of formal public engagement with the lawmaking process. Consequently, the Court 
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to formal consideration and response . . . .”). 
281 We the People Found., Inc. v. United States, ()$ F.#d !(', !(" (D.C. Cir. "''*). 
282 Id. at !(!-(". 
283 The Smith Court discussed the public employment dimension of the case when considering 
the state’s obligations and noted that, while bypassing a union and dealing directly with employees 
might constitute an unfair labor practice under federal law, “[t]he First Amendment is not a 
substitute for the national labor relations laws.” Ark. State Highway Emps., Local !#!# v. Smith, ((! 
U.S. (%#, (%(-%$ (!&*&). Moreover, as Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Guarnieri suggests, it may have 
been possible to distinguish between petitions submitted to the government as an employer and 
petitions submitted to the government as a sovereign. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, $%( U.S. 
#*&, ('* ("'!!) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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to response or o.cial consideration.286 Ultimately, however, both Judge 
Kavanaugh and Judge Rogers agreed that the circuit court was bound by Smith 
and Knight.287 The task of reconciling the Petition Clause doctrine with 
historical evidence, as Judge Rogers’s concurrence observed, would pose “an 
interesting question” for the court.288 
At +rst blush, it is di.cult to reconcile the Noerr line of cases, which 
identify a right to meaningful access which can be infringed upon by 
preventing petitions from being heard, with Smith and Knight, which suggest 
that the government is free to infringe upon that right essentially at will. 
Indeed, if the carriers in California Motor could collude to deny their 
competitors “free and meaningful access” by keeping petitions from being 
heard, it seems clear that the government in Smith and Knight, by ignoring 
petitions altogether based on their source, had likewise denied the petitioners 
“free and meaningful access.” 
One important distinction between these cases, however, is the existence 
and nature of formal channels. In California Motor, at issue was the carrier’s 
free and meaningful access to the courts and administrative agencies, the 
formal and appropriate channels for their grievances. In Smith and Knight, 
however, the issue was whether the government was obligated to consider 
grievances submitted through alternative or informal channels. As Justice 
O’Connor noted, in Smith “the government listened only to individual 
employees and not to the union,” while in Knight the government met only 
“with the union and not with individual employees.”289 Per California Motor, 
individuals have a right of access to formal channels, while per Smith and 
Knight, there is no general right of access that would require the government 
to hear and consider petitions submitted outside those channels. 
B. The Petition Clause Doctrine as Information 
The Supreme Court has also recognized the important role that petitions 
play in providing information to both government officials and the public at 
large.290 In Noerr, the conduct complained of was a public advocacy campaign 
 
286 Id. at !(( (noting several examples of commentary on this point, as well as certain 
commentators arguing to the contrary); see also id. at !(* (Rogers, J., concurring) (echoing this 
sentiment and further emphasizing the “emerging consensus of scholars” embracing a historically 
informed interpretation of the right to petition (quoting Lawson & Seidman, supra note !$), at *$%)). 
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288 Id. at !(&. 
289 Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, (%$ U.S. "*!, ")%-)* (!&)(). 
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aimed at promoting certain laws which would have been unfavorable to the 
trucking industry.291 The truckers sued under the Sherman Act, seeking in part 
to enjoin the railroads from “disseminating any disparaging information about 
the truckers without disclosing railroad participation” and from “attempting 
to exert any pressure upon the legislature or Governor.”292 In response, the 
railroads asserted their rights under the First Amendment to “inform the 
public and legislatures of the several states.”293 While Noerr held only that the 
Sherman Act did not reach this sort of political activity, Justice Black’s 
majority opinion noted the informational interests at stake, stating that “the 
whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to 
make their wishes known to their representatives” and that “[t]o hold that the 
government retains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet 
hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the government 
of their wishes . . . would raise important constitutional questions.”294 
Justice Black’s majority was not merely concerned with an individual’s 
rights, but with the value of information generally. The Court noted that even 
if the railroad’s “sole purpose in seeking to in-uence the passage and 
enforcement of laws was to destroy the truckers as competitors,” this would 
not alter the analysis, as “[t]he right of the people to inform their 
representatives in government of their desires . . . cannot properly be made 
to depend upon their intent in doing so.”295 Indeed, even petitions made 
purely to secure personal advantage “provide much of the information upon 
which governments must act.”296 Accordingly, construing the Sherman Act to 
restrain political advocacy would “deprive the government of a valuable 
source of information.”297 Years later, California Motor rea.rmed this view of 
petitions as promoting both individual rights and government interests, with 
Justice Stewart observing that Noerr’s holding was necessary both to “protect 
the right of petition guaranteed by the First Amendment” and to “preserve 
the informed operation of governmental processes.”298 
More recently, the Court has observed how depriving individuals and groups 
of the right to petition affects the information available to lawmakers and the 
public. In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, the Court considered whether a union 
grievance submitted by police officer Charles Guarnieri to his employer was 
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protected under the Petition Clause.299 Lower courts were split over whether 
the Petition Clause protected only communications about public matters or 
whether it also protected communications that addressed purely private matters, 
such as Guarnieri’s employment.300 
After reviewing the history of the right to petition,301 Justice Kennedy 
clari+ed the distinction between the right to free speech and the right to 
petition, stating that while the right to free speech “fosters [a] public exchange 
of ideas,” the right to petition “allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, 
and concerns to their government and their elected representatives.”302 As the 
Court in Guarnieri observed, the right to petition not only protects the voice 
of political minorities but also ensures that ideas and information from 
minorities and other groups are disseminated to the public and to 
lawmakers.303 Moreover, the Court noted that public employees like Charles 
Guarnieri were “the members of a community most likely to have informed 
and de+nite opinions” about issues relating to their employment, and that the 
public at large “has a right to the bene+t” of public employees’ participation 
in petitioning.304 In particular, the Court noted, petitions may “allow the 
public airing of disputed facts” and “promote the evolution of the law by 
supporting the development of legal theories.”305 
Petitioning, in other words, has value both to the petitioner and to the 
lawmaking process at large, and such value “may not accrue if one class of 
knowledgeable and motivated citizens is prevented from engaging in 
petitioning activity.”306 While the Guarnieri Court here referred speci+cally 
to public employees, this reasoning applies with equal force to all groups, 
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300 Id. at #)$ (noting that, while courts in other circuits required an employee’s petition to 
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Court of Appeals below had rejected this view). Speci-cally, Guarnieri alleged that his employer 
had retaliated against him in response to his grievance, and several lower courts had adopted a 
“public concern” requirement for retaliation claims. This requirement has its origins in the Court’s 
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particularly political minorities.307 Whenever any segment of society is 
excluded from participation in government—whether prevented from 
petitioning, ignored by their government, or foreclosed by powerful 
interests—the information that group might have provided is excluded as 
well, to the public’s detriment. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The history of formal petitioning shows that the Petition Clause does 
more than guarantee an individual right to participate in the lawmaking 
process. It also serves as a guide for how the government should structure 
participation in that process, including how to allocate lawmaker access and 
how lawmakers should obtain necessary information. Moreover, as the 
previous Part illustrates, the historical interests in access and information are 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s Petition Clause jurisprudence.308 While 
past legislative e,orts at lobbying reform have largely focused on regulating 
lobbyists themselves, such as through registration or disclosure 
requirements,309 a focus on access and information as important Petition 
Clause values suggest a path forward via institutional reforms. In this Part, I 
argue that Congress and other legislatures should take a.rmative steps to 
formalize access, increase institutional support, and bolster public 
information gathering mechanisms. Moreover, while past legislative e,orts 
have struggled to pass constitutional muster under the Speech Clause,310 
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institutional reforms such as these would be more easily defended under an 
independent Petition Clause doctrine rooted in historical context. Such a 
doctrine, I argue, should more explicitly a.rm the government’s interests in 
promoting equitable access to government and in providing lawmakers with 
broad and inclusive information and should also recognize these as important 
rationales for regulation under the Petition Clause 
A. Implications for Institutional Reform 
To fully realize the right to petition’s promise, institutional reform is 
necessary. A lack of institutional support for petitioning helped contribute to 
the rise of our current lobbying system.311 Creating new formal mechanisms 
for engagement would not only better comport with the history of the right 
to petition, but it would also help to draw a distinction between those formal 
processes which the right to petition protects and those informal attempts at 
access not protected.312 A focus on petitioning’s historical context also 
provides lawmakers with an opportunity to develop new systems of public 
engagement to account for the dramatic changes in attention scarcity and 
lawmakers’ information needs that have occurred since the Founding. 
!. Avenues for Institutional Change 
First and foremost, Congress and state legislatures should establish, either 
by rule or by statute, formal procedures for petitioning and public 
engagement with lawmakers. While these procedures would likely di,er in 
some ways from their historical counterparts—they might not, for example, 
insist upon a formal prayer for relief—they should be crafted with access and 
information interests in mind. Access should be egalitarian, with submissions 
received on equal footing without respect to their source, and in keeping with 
the history of petitioning, all submissions should be guaranteed 
consideration, if not also response. 
Such a system would provide a way to allocate government access by 
regulating the procedures through which individuals and groups 
communicate with government o.cials without restricting the content of 
those communications or who may submit them. Creating a formal system 
would also draw a clear distinction between a formal channel protected by the 
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311 See supra Section II.C. 
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Petition Clause and informal attempts at access which could be further 
regulated to the extent that they seek to circumvent or undermine formal 
procedures.313 A formal system would also have the added bene+t of collecting 
all submissions in one place and creating a record to which lawmakers could 
refer as a source of information. 
Second, to ensure equitable access given limited lawmaker attention, new 
mechanisms must be created to manage the volume of petitions. History offers 
several methods for dealing with a large number of petitions. Congress has 
established administrative agencies and specialized courts in part to receive 
and consider petitions within specific subject areas.314 Inside Congress, large 
numbers of similar petitions historically were consolidated, and frivolous 
petitions were summarily dismissed.315 Those petitions which did reach the 
congressional floor would then be referred to committees in order to grant 
them due consideration without occupying the attention of the entire body.316 
New approaches will also be necessary in order to realize the right to 
petition’s promise of equal access and consideration, including the use of new 
technology to make petitioning more widely and easily available. Since the 
early ")))s, for example, administrative agencies have increasingly shifted 
notice and comment rulemaking online,317 greatly expanding the public’s 
ability to participate in the rulemaking process.318 This has, in turn, impacted 
the decisionmaking process. In ")!(, for example, e-rulemaking enabled the 
public to submit #.% million comments as part of the Federal 
Communications Commission’s proposed Net Neutrality order.319 The 
resulting ")!& Open Internet Order320 was heavily in-uenced by those 
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scattered sections of (* C.F.R.). 
!"*) University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !$%: !"#& 
comments.321 Several proposals for a similar online system for petitioning 
Congress have been made,322 and while an online petition system would no 
doubt bring its own technical challenges,323 it is likely that such a system 
would be necessary in order to handle the volume of petitions submitted and 
to ensure that they are organized in such a way as to be capable of receiving 
meaningful consideration. 
Finally, the government should actively encourage and facilitate public 
participation as part of an active information-gathering process, as opposed 
to taking participation as a given. Congress and state legislatures should 
support and expand public information-gathering sources in order to provide 
nonpartisan independent expertise on complex policy issues. The 
administrative state provides ready examples of agencies +lled with highly 
specialized career experts who are tasked with providing independent 
research and information to policymakers.324 Similarly, Congress’s internal 
bureaucracy of nonpartisan expert institutions—including the Congressional 
Research Service and the O.ce of Budget and Management, among 
others325—was developed in part to provide lawmakers with a similar source 
of independent expertise as the executive branch, but has in recent years seen 
support dwindle.326 Reinvesting in and expanding public information-
gathering institutions such as these would help provide lawmakers with more 
complete information and thus reduce the need to rely on private interests. 
 
321 See Moxley, supra note #!&, at %)$-&# (describing in detail how the "'!$ Open Internet Order 
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322 See, e.g., Lee Drutman, A Better Way to Fix Lobbying, (' ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE STUD. !, 
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Expertise, however, is not a silver bullet. As the history of petitioning 
illustrates, the public itself is a vital source of information that can help 
supplement expert advice and draw attention to important issues that might 
otherwise be overlooked.327 Moving forward, any new system of public 
engagement should strive to solicit information from the public and incorporate 
it into the decisionmaking process. The Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-
and-comment procedure, for example, leverages public participation as a source 
of valuable information that often serves to correct agency errors and 
oversights.328 Creating a similar system for public participation in the legislative 
process would help fill information gaps, with petitions raising new concerns 
and comments supplementing independent expertise. 
". Objections 
The reforms suggested above may be subject to two general criticisms. 
First is the question of feasibility—whether given the demands on lawmaker 
attention, the ever-increasing torrent of information from competition 
interest groups, and the expansion of the government’s role a formal 
mechanism of public engagement is even possible. Indeed, as discussed above, 
formal petitioning declined in part because formal mechanisms were unable to 
keep up with the sheer volume of petitions.329 As Professor Blackhawk notes, 
however, such feasibility concerns have been resolved before in the lower 
federal courts and in administrative agencies, both of which have successfully 
scaled alongside the growth of the American population and the expansion of 
federal jurisdiction.330 Moreover, she observes, our current lobbying system is 
already a multi-billion dollar industry, and Congress and other legislatures 
every day invest resources into allocating access and obtaining information.331 
Second is the question of efficacy. That is, even if formal channels were 
established, what is there to stop lawmakers from simply ignoring them and 
continuing to engage with lobbyists informally? One response is that a formal 
system could be accompanied by stricter regulations on informal access, 
including disclosure requirements and ethics rules. Another is that the creation 
of a formal system of public engagement would make clear the distinction 
between appropriate and inappropriate means of access and thus make it much 
easier for the public to hold accountable any lawmakers who choose to 
 
327 See supra Section II.B. 
328 See Sunstein, supra note #!) (observing that “[d]emocratization of the regulatory process, 
through public comment, has an epistemic value” and that where an “agency has inaccurately 
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329 See supra Section II.C. 
330 See McKinley, supra note &, at !"'!-'". 
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circumvent formal procedures.332 But even accepting the cynical position that 
some lawmakers would continue to afford lobbyists informal access, 
establishing formal procedures would still ensure that some lawmaker access 
is allocated more equitably and that more of the information lawmakers act 
upon is obtained from sources other than lobbyists. 
B. Doctrinal Implications 
The most signi+cant obstacle facing any attempt at lobbying reform is a 
potential First Amendment challenge. As Professor Hasen has noted, where 
lobbying is treated as a form of political speech, legislative approaches to 
lobbying reform are often subject to strict scrutiny under the First 
Amendment, requiring that measures be narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling government interest.333 Traditionally, lower courts have upheld a 
variety of lobbying regulations under the First Amendment, even under strict 
scrutiny, based on either an anticorruption or an antidistortion rationale.334 
Following the Supreme Court’s sweeping campaign +nance decision in 
Citizens United in ")!), however, these rationales have struggled in the lower 
courts.335 The Supreme Court’s invitation in Guarnieri to more fully consider 
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the right to petition in its historical context, however, suggests an alternative 
path forward under an independent Petition Clause doctrine. The history of 
formal petitioning suggests that the government may have a compelling 
interest in allocating government access and in providing lawmakers with 
information. Thus, while direct restrictions on lobbying might implicate the 
Speech Clause, the structural and institutional reforms described above 
would be much more easily defended under an independent Petition Clause 
doctrine informed by this history. 
!. Distinguishing the Right to Petition from the Right to Free Speech 
In Guarnieri, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to petition is 
distinct from the right to speech and should be interpreted according to its 
underlying “objectives and aspirations.”336 Since then, lower courts have 
struggled to divine those objectives and aspirations and the extent to which 
traditional speech clause analysis should apply to petition cases.337 But as the 
history of petitioning demonstrates, speech and petition implicate wholly 
di,erent sets of values which, if taken seriously, would form the foundation 
of a distinct Petition Clause doctrine. 
Many of the core values of the Court’s Free Speech doctrine are a poor +t 
for the concerns raised by petitioning and government access. For example, a 
major concern of much of the twentieth century’s speech jurisprudence was 
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the role that free speech played in promoting public debate and democratic 
deliberation.338 In the “marketplace of ideas” model, the First Amendment’s 
protection of free speech fosters discussion and deliberation, allowing ideas 
to rise or fall on the basis of their truth and persuasiveness alone.339 Famously, 
in such a model, the remedy for false or objectionable speech is not regulation, 
but deliberation—that is, “more speech.”340 
As Professor Wu has observed, however, this vision of political speech 
relies on the -awed assumption that listeners have the time and ability to hear 
and be in-uenced by the di,erent ideas in the market.341 With the rise of the 
Internet and the explosive proliferation of speech, however, there is simply 
too much information for any individual to consume, let alone consider.342 In 
a +nite body such as Congress, this e,ect is magni+ed.343 If scarce lawmaker 
attention is the problem, then “more lobbying” simply cannot be the remedy, 
and indeed it is already the case that lawmakers pick and choose whom to 
listen to and whom to ignore, albeit informally. Likewise, if information-
gathering is a core Petition Clause value, this suggests that the information 
lawmakers have available to them should not be left up to market-like forces. 
The “marketplace of ideas” model also assumes that government 
intervention is the primary threat to the free -ow of ideas and that, left alone, 
the marketplace will take care of itself.344 In the context of petitioning or 
lobbying, this assumption fails on two grounds. First, as California Motor and 
the Noerr-Pennington line of cases demonstrates, private parties are quite able 
to infringe upon the exercise of the right to petition.345 Indeed, given the 
scarcity of lawmaker attention, every successful e,ort to have one’s client 
heard necessarily comes at the expense of other groups. Second, the 
government cannot stay out of the “marketplace” of lobbying and petitioning 
because it is the government’s attention that is being sought. Whether the 
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government uses a formal and institutionalized petition process or an 
informal lobbying system, it nonetheless makes decisions about how to 
allocate its attention, which unavoidably results in winners and losers. 
If we take seriously the right to petition’s allocative and informational 
dimensions, it becomes apparent that the right to petition not only permits some 
government intervention, but may in fact require it.346 Just as protecting one’s 
procedural right of due process in a court of law requires the government to 
afford access and to define a process by which parties may by heard, so too would 
a proceduralist right to petition require the government to establish a formal 
mechanism and to take steps to ensure that mechanism is not circumvented.347 
The right to petition’s interests in access and information distinguish it from the 
right to free speech and should inform the development of a distinct Petition 
Clause doctrine that would delineate between expressions protected by the Free 
Speech Clause and those protected by the Petition Clause.348 
". New Rationales for Regulation 
Even if petitions continue to be considered under the Speech Clause, or if 
the Court decides to incorporate Speech precedents into the Petition Clause 
doctrine, access and information interests could still inform the Court’s 
analysis as new rationales for government regulation and reform. Moreover, 
while past attempts at restricting lobbying directly have struggled under strict 
scrutiny,349 the institutional reforms advocated here would not restrict speech 
and would likely be easier to defend under these new rationales. 
First, the history of petitioning suggests that the government has a 
compelling interest in the equitable allocation of government access. That is, 
the government has an interest in ensuring that the lawmaking process 
remains open to political minorities and that powerful interests are not able 
to foreclose access to others by virtue of their wealth or in-uence. 
In the campaign finance context, the Supreme Court has rejected attempts 
to justify restrictions on political spending in the interest of “leveling the 
playing field,” or otherwise combatting the distorting effect of money in 
politics.350 At first blush, then, it would seem odd to suggest that the right to 
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petition’s access interest should pass constitutional muster. But these two 
interests differ in three ways. First, while the anti-distortion rationale rejected 
in Citizens United was focused on the “political marketplace” of elections, 351 the 
right to petition is by definition confined to the lawmaking context, where the 
“marketplace of ideas” model is a poor fit.352 Second, while the anti-distortion 
rationale focused on limiting campaign spending and thus expression, this 
rationale focuses on access, not expression. Smith and Knight are illustrative 
here: in both cases, the statutes upheld in no way infringed upon the 
petitioner’s ability to spend money on petitions or the content of those petitions 
and focused instead on which petitions the government would agree to 
consider.353 Third, the right to petition’s access interest is procedural, and as the 
Court in Citizens United affirmed, cases like Noerr and California Motor expressly 
protect the quasi-procedural right to meaningful access to courts and 
administrative bodies where formal channels exist.354 A legislative approach 
that seeks to ensure equal access by all parties could hardly be seen to run afoul 
of the First Amendment, even if it would have the practical effect of reducing 
the share of lawmaker attention that goes to politically powerful interests. 
The history of petitioning also suggests that the government has a 
compelling interest in providing lawmakers with broad and inclusive 
information. Information is a prerequisite to e,ective lawmaking, and the 
Supreme Court has generally favored disclosure requirements in part because 
they contribute to, rather than restrict, the -ow of information.355 This has 
been the case both with respect to lobbying and campaign +nance.356 The 
Court has also upheld the ability of Congress to issue subpoenas and hold 
hearings to collect information.357 And cases like California Motor and 
Guarnieri a.rm the role that petitions play in providing lawmakers with 
information. Perhaps more important than the doctrinal precedent here is the 
legislative precedent. The Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and 
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comment provisions, for example, do more than simply provide the public 
with a way to give input on proposed regulations; they also generate a broad 
and inclusive record upon which decisions are to be made.358 Similar 
structural reforms aimed at Congress or other legislatures would likewise 
further lawmakers’ interest in information-gathering. 
CONCLUSION 
The history of formal petitioning reveals that the right to petition 
protects more than simply a form of political expression. Rather, it protects 
a right to participate in the lawmaking process. The formal procedures that 
characterized petitioning in Parliament, colonial governments, and Congress 
provided individuals and groups with a quasi-procedural right to access 
legislative bodies and to have their petitions considered on equal footing. In 
return, petitions provided lawmakers with broad and inclusive information 
necessary for e,ective governance. These two interests—access and 
information—were central to petitioning, and as the institutions that 
supported formal petitioning declined, these same interests spurred the rise 
of our modern lobbying system. 
Attempts to reform our lobbying system raise foundational questions 
under the First Amendment, requiring foundational solutions. Whereas past 
e,orts at regulating lobbying have focused on the speech and activity of 
lobbyists themselves, the history of petitioning invites us to view the problem 
from an institutional perspective. Moving forward, Congress and state 
legislatures should consider the history of the right to petition as a guide for 
allocating government access and as a mechanism for generating broad and 
inclusive information. Likewise, the Supreme Court should employ this 
history in developing a distinct Petition Clause doctrine that recognizes the 
ongoing importance of access and information. By taking seriously these 
interests, the right to petition’s vision of a formal, equal, and informative 
system of public engagement can be more fully realized. 
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